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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW, THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CONSUMERISM,
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS AND PERILS
Mark E. Budnitz*
INTRODUCTION
This article examines major developments in the laws that regulate
consumer financial services beginning with the Federal Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) that took effect in 1969.1 Dramatic changes have
occurred both in the law and in industry products and practices over
the forty years covered in this survey. Some have benefited
consumers, while others have not. The current economic crisis has
brought renewed attention to the adequacy of these laws and their
enforcement. Understanding the context within which consumer law
has evolved will better prepare policymakers to make sound
decisions when considering improvements to it.
Part I describes the lack of consumer protection law and lawyers
before 1969. The few consumer organizations that existed were not
focused on consumer financial services. Part II traces the birth and
infancy of consumer protection law. That Part includes an
* Bobby Lee Cook Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author thanks
his past and current research assistants, Miltonette Craig and Elizabeth Lewis, for their contributions to
the article. The author also is grateful for the support of the College of Law.
1. Arguably, the first federal consumer protection statute was the Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938
that clearly established the Federal Trade Commission's authority to protect consumers from unfair and
deceptive acts and practices. Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938); MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD,
CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 53 (2009); DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD & DAVID W. CARROLL, CONSUMER
PROTECTIONS: TEXT AND MATERIALS 59 (2d ed. 1977). In addition, the states had a variety of usury
laws regulating interest rates and retail installment sales acts requiring disclosures. GREENFIELD, supra,
at 2. One commentator described the chaotic state law situation this way: "These laws combined in a
complex tangle of independent, noncomprehensive, and noncoordinated regulation within any one state,
with the pattern varying from one state to the next." Paul A. Mondor, Lock-in Laws: Adding More
Patches to the Mortgage Lending Quilt, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 543, 545-46 (1988). The focus of this
paper, however, is on federal statutes and regulations that provide consumers with a private right of
action, which the FTC Act does not do. GREENFIELD, supra, at 99. For a brief description of the events
leading up to enactment of TILA, see ROBERT J. HOBBS & STEPHEN GARDNER, THE PRACTICE OF
CONSUMER LAW: SEEKING ECONOMIC JUSTICE 10-11 (2d ed. 2006).
1147
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1147 2009-2010
 P ENT SU ER 
  
I I NALIZATION IS , 
     
  * 
TION 
  l ents   
r  i i   l   
 .1   
  ti s  
r  it  
r ,  t   
       
t.  t    
 r  rs  
  ts  
   
ti s   
 
 r    
* Bobby Lee Cook Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author thanks 
     t  , tions  
 .  f l   
I. l ,   i   l r- ea t   
t l  i     rity t rs   
ti e . . ); , 
 o   
I : ,     i t   r  
, ra, 
  t r i  t   
l   , i e, i ted  o  
    .  l . , i   i   
s t   e ilt, .     
    
 pra,  ti    
t 1    
  
 
1
Budnitz: The Development of Consumer Protection Law, The Institutionalizat
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
explanation of how the federal anti-poverty program resulted in the
first consumer protection lawyers as well as an analysis of the Truth
in Lending Act, state legislation, Supreme Court cases, and the role
of federal administrative agencies. Part III describes how consumer
protection law was undermined starting with the Reagan
administration. Part IV describes the lack of significant developments
during the presidencies of the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, as
well as the major setbacks that occurred while George W. Bush was
president. Part V examines the challenges of the 21st Century,
including developments in technology and the obstacles posed by
mandatory arbitration.
During the forty years covered in this survey, consumers have
continued to face severe problems, and the consumer financial
services industry has never slowed its promotion of new practices
consumers regard as unfair and deceptive while opposing stronger
consumer protection law and enforcement. Given the vast disparity of
resources between individual consumers and the industry, the
continued viability of efforts to promote consumer protection law is a
major concern to those who believe stronger laws and enforcement
are essential. Part VI examines the keys to the survival of those
efforts. It describes consumerism and its role as a movement for
social change and law reform as a means to realize social change. It
also describes the development of a permanent organizational
structure for engaging in litigation as well as legislative and
regulatory advocacy. Part VI contends that consumerism has become
institutionalized and its values have become embedded in society's
values, better ensuring its survival.
Part VII turns to the present, exploring the prospects for continued
development of strong consumer protection law and the perils such
progress faces. It does this by analyzing the Credit Card Act of 2009
and President Obama's proposed Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act.
[Vol. 26:41148
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I. THE WAY WE WERE: LIFE BEFORE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
Before passage of the Truth in Lending Act in 1968, there were no
federal laws regulating the consumer financial services industry that
provided consumers with a private right of action.2 State laws were
inadequate. 3 There were few, if any, lawyers whose practice was
primarily protecting consumers.4 Law schools offered few, if any,
courses devoted to consumer law.5 No consumer organization
produced continually updated manuals for lawyers taking consumer
cases or regularly scheduled conferences at which those lawyers
could learn from experienced consumer attorneys and network with
others. 6 No organization regularly represented consumers in Congress
or before administrative agencies. 7 The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) was ineffectual. 8
This lack of activity was not the result of consumers living in an
environment devoid of major consumer problems. Major issues
included the following: state-assisted seizure of consumer property
through pre-judgment repossession and garnishment; 9 assignees of
2. Adam Goldstein, Why "It Pays" to "Leave Home Without It": Examining the Legal Culpability
of Credit Card Issuers Under Tort Principles of Products Liability, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 827, 834-35
(2006) (noting TILA's inclusion of a private right of action).
3. BARBARA A. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 3 (1965) ("Enactment of
legislation relating to credit arrangements has not followed the pattern of expansion of the market.
Regulation has been devised on an ad hoc basis to take care of problems and abuses or to clarify
relationships as the need for such regulation became apparent ....").
4. DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 5-6 (2004); TANG THANH TRAI LE, PROTECTING
CONSUMER RIGHTS § 1.06 (1987).
5. An indication of the presence of consumer law courses is the publication of casebooks for use in
those courses. Among the earliest the author has identified are HOMER KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT:
TEXT-CASES-MATERIALS (1970) and DAVID A. RICE, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS (1975).
6. In 1982 NCLC began producing what has grown to a seventeen-volume series that is continually
updated. See, e.g., JONATHAN SHELDON & CONSTANCE G. BRIGHAM, REPOSSESSIONS (1982)
(exemplifying one of the first volumes in the series); see HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 20.
7. The Consumer Federation of America was established in 1967 for the purpose of representing
consumer interests before Congress and federal agencies. See HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 10-
11.
8. EDWARD F. Cox, ROBERT C. FELLMETH & JOHN E. SCHULZ, THE "NADER REPORT" ON THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); Report of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade
Commission [July-Sept.], ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA SPEC. SUPP.) No. 427 (1969).
9. The facts in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment seizure of property) and
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment wage garnishment), illustrate how
these creditor remedies subjected consumers to deprivation of property absent an opportunity for a
hearing at a meaningful time.
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consumer paper immunized from consumer claims and defenses
through the holder-in-due course doctrine;' 0 abusive debt collection
practices;" credit discrimination; 12 excessive interest rates;13 lack of
warranty protection; 14 fraud; 15 breach of the peace when creditors
resorted to self-help repossession; 16  and cross-collateralization
provisions. 17 Low income consumers were targeted.
18
There were few consumer organizations and they did not devote
resources to protecting consumers using financial services. The
National Consumers League was established in 1898.19 It
investigated working conditions. 20 Consumers Union was formed in
1936.21 For many years its efforts were primarily devoted to
consumer testing.22 Probably the first successful grassroots consumer
organization was the Consumers Education and Protective
10. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form over Intent in
Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 367 (2002) (describing how assignees working
with creditors were protected from consumer claims by the holder in due course doctrine).
11. Matthew W. Ludwig, Abuse, Harassment, and Deception: How the FDCPA Is Failing America's
Elderly Debtors, 16 ELDER L.J. 135, 140 (2008) (noting congressional finding that third party debt
collector abuse was a widespread and national problem).
12. MICHAEL GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO REPRESENT SELLERS,
LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 338 (1995) (noting that by the early 1970s systematic credit discrimination
against women was well documented); Andrea M. Farley, The Spousal Defense-A Ploy to Escape
Payment or Simple Application of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act?, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1287, 1291-92
(1996) (describing Congressional inquiries and hearings into discriminatory credit practices).
13. States had usury laws, but they were inadequate. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding,
and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV.
807, 858-72 (2003).
14. Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning As Reflected in the Judicial
Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
173, 184-88 (2003) (describing merchant practices in the 1960s that shielded them from warranty
claims).
15. Jones v. West Side Buick Auto Co., 93 S.W.2d 1083 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936) (fraudulent odometer
rollback).
16. See, e.g., Kensinger Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 269 S.W.2d 792 (Ark. 1954) (finding that
person attempting to repossess consumer's vehicle grabbed his hand and threatened him). See Eugene
Mikolajczk, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code-A Modern
Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK. L. REV. 351 (1977).
17. GREENFIELD, supra note 12, § 12.2 (describing cross-collateral provisions).
18. See, e.g., In re Leon A. Tashof, 74 F.T.C. 1361 (1968), affid, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
19. HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 6.
20. Id.
21. ConsumersUnion.org, Nonprofit Publisher of Consumer Reports,
http://www.consumersunion.org (last visited June 20, 2009).
22. HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 8.
[Vol. 26:41150
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Association.23 It established a grievance process for handling
individual consumer complaints, engaged in direct action such as
picketing car dealers who sold lemons, conducted petition drives, and
voiced consumers' concerns in public hearings. 24 It had a significant
influence on the consumer movement throughout the country.
25
II. THE BIRTH AND INFANCY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
A. The First Consumer Lawyers
In order to understand the beginnings of consumer protection law
regulating financial services, it is necessary to appreciate the social
and political context in which it took place and the type of law
practice in which many of the first consumer lawyers represented
their clients. In brief summary, the battle for civil rights developed
into a widespread movement in the 1960s. A single Supreme Court
case, Brown v. Board of Education,26 was a major catalyst. The civil
rights movement broadened into a more general endeavor to alleviate
poverty among people of all races. That effort received the support of
the federal government when, as part of President Johnson's War on
Poverty, Congress enacted legislation establishing the Office of
Economic Opportunity (OEO).27
OEO realized one of the best ways to cure some of the poor's
problems was to provide them with lawyers. Consequently, on its
own initiative, it created the Legal Services Program.28 Law reform
was an explicit goal of that program. 29 The Legal Services Program
23. Besse S. Weiner & Judy Canahuati Weiner, Consumers Education and Protective Association, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 173-75 (Stephen Brobeck ed. 1997). "When Max
Weiner and fifteen other people founded the Consumers Education and Protective Association ... in
1966, consumer protection was almost nonexistent." Id. at 173-74.
24. Id. at 174.
25. Id.
26. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM 41 (1974); MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 142 (1993) (stating that poverty lawyers were informed by the civil
rights movement); see Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, repealed
by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. VI, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 519.
28. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 127.
29. Id. at 130-33.
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was a significant departure from the approach of most of the
traditional legal aid offices that represented the poor in the past. The
goal of legal aid was to provide the poor with access to legal
representation.30 The substantive law was regarded as fair to all.3'
Objectives that might have secured a more lasting benefit such as
using the law to improve the social and economic status of the poor
were not a priority. 32 Few cases were appealed, 33 and no case was
ever brought before the Supreme Court.3 4
The Legal Services Program was based on a different model. The
Legal Services Program began disbursing funds to local offices in
1965. 35 They did so without first deciding whether the program's top
priority should be access to the legal system for low income persons
or reform of that system.36 By 1967, however, faced with a
burgeoning caseload and inadequate resources to provide access to
more than a small number of the poor, the Legal Services Program
proclaimed law reform to be its national priority.
37
Consistent with the approach of the Legal Services Program,
lawyers representing clients with consumer problems in local legal
services offices receiving funding from the Legal Services Program
began bringing cases that sought, not only to gain redress for their
clients' immediate problems, but also to change laws that worked to
their clients' detriment. Although lawyers undoubtedly brought
consumer cases and advocated for consumer laws before the advent
of the Legal Services Program, that program created the opportunity
for substantial numbers of lawyers across the country to launch a
large number of consumer law reform efforts. This article describes
the important role these lawyers played in the development of this
country's consumer law.
30. Id at 11-12.
31. Id. at 13.
32. Id.; see also DAVIS, supra note 27, at 10.
33. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 14.
34. Id. at 13.
35. Id. at 127.
36. Id. at 70.
37. Id at 130-33.
[Vol. 26:41152
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Also significant to the development of consumer law was the Legal
Services Program's decision to fund national backup centers to
participate in law reform. The Legal Services Program believed that
national support centers would be better equipped to bring law reform
cases than local offices because they would specialize in narrow
fields of law, something most local offices would not have the ability
to do.38 In addition, the backup centers were expected to engage in
training and produce research materials that would assist local offices
in their cases. 39 Boston College Law School submitted a grant
proposal to OEO to establish a consumer backup center, OEO
approved, and the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) began
operating in 1969, the same year the Truth in Lending Act went into
effect. 4° In 1995, however, OEO's successor, the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC), bowing to political pressure and the certainty of a
substantial funding cutback, terminated funding of all backup centers,
including NCLC's. As discussed in Part VI.A.2, even after losing
LSC funding,41  NCLC has played a significant role in the
development of consumer law in the United States.42 After losing
LSC funding, NCLC was instrumental in organizing private
consumer attorneys into a national association, and also continued
their consumer law activities.
38. JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 182.
39. Id.
40. William F. Willier, National Consumer Law Center: Current and Projected Activities, 3
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 64 (1969). Professor William F. Willier was NCLC's first Executive Director. Id
NCLC's connection to the federal Truth in Lending Act was more than the coincidence of sharing the
same commencement date. Senator William Proxmire credited Willier with playing a direct role in the
enactment of the federal law. John H. Fenton, Boston College to Aid Consumer, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1969. TILA's effective date was 1969. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 504, 82 Stat. 146, 167 (1968). For a
description of the welfare rights movement and its relationship to OEO, see Jack Greenberg, Litigation
for Social Change: Method, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 REC. ASS'N B. CITY OF N.Y. 320 (1974),
reprinted in JACK GREENBERG, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
581, 590, 592-93 (1977).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 218-23.
42. The author was Executive Director of NCLC from 1975-1979. He is currently on NCLC's Board
of Directors.
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B. The Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) was the first federal law
designed to protect consumers shopping for credit. 43 TILA's main
proponent was Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois.44 He has been
called the "father" of TILA.45 TILA was intended to ameliorate the
46inadequacies of state law. Although consumer advocates are among
its chief critics today,47 in the years following its enactment, it has
provided consumer lawyers with a litigation handle for ameliorating
48the problems of their clients.
For example, a consumer might come to her lawyer's office
complaining that she cannot afford to pay a loan because of the high
interest rate. She claims the lender lied to her about the true cost of
the loan, and never disclosed many of the terms. State usury law,
however, may permit the high interest rate the lender charged.
Moreover, the lender's oral fraud in regard to the true cost would be
difficult to prove. The law generally does not require lenders to orally
disclose important information as long as it is clearly disclosed in
written documents and the consumer has the opportunity to read the
documents.49 However, if the consumer's attorney can find a TILA
violation on the face of the loan documents, the consumer has a cause
of action with which to counter the lender's conduct.
Indeed, consumer lawyers found rampant violations of TILA and
brought thousands of lawsuits as well as using those violations as
counterclaims in what had heretofore been "slam dunk" debt
43. Enactment of TILA "marked the birth of modem consumer legislative activism." ELIZABETH
RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, TRuTH IN LENDING 4 (6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter RENUART & KEEST-
TILA]. TILA is one part of umbrella legislation called the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA).
Peterson, supra note 13, at 880. In addition to TILA, which is Subchapter I, CCPA includes Subchapter
II, restrictions on garnishment, Subchapter IIA, Credit Repair Organizations, Subchapter III, Credit
Reporting Agencies, Subchapter IV, Equal Credit Opportunity, Subchapter V, debt collection practices,
and Subchapter VI, electronic fund transfers.
44. Peterson, supra note 13, at 877.
45. RENUART & KEEST-TILA, supra note 43, at 1.
46. Id
47. Peterson, supra note 13, at 880-81.
48. RENUART & KEEST-TILA, supra note 43, at 3-4 (explaining that TILA disclosures may provide
information that can be used to bring actions for violation of laws besides TILA).
49. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1969) (TILA disclosures for transactions other than under an open
end credit plan); id. § 1638(b) (requiring TILA disclosures be made before credit is extended).
[Vol. 26:41154
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collection claims, 50 winning most of these cases. 51 The credit industry
complained to Congress, resulting in the 1980 enactment of the Truth
in Lending "Simplification" Act that greatly reduced the ability of
consumer lawyers to sue for TILA violations. 52 Nevertheless,
consumer lawyers who had brought cases under the original version
of TILA gained valuable experience they could use in bringing cases
under other statutes. Moreover, even after "simplification" TILA is
still an important resource for consumer lawyers. It continues to
impose many requirements upon creditors and provides consumers
with meaningful remedies such as actual damages, statutory damages,
costs, attorney fees, and in certain situations three years to cancel
transactions where the creditor takes a security interest in the
consumer's home. 53 In addition, by examining the TILA disclosures
and the amounts disclosed, the consumer's lawyer may discover
violations of state usury laws or the common law.
54
C. State Legislation
In 1968, the same year TILA was enacted, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws published the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC). 55 The drafters were guided by
several basic assumptions which included: usury laws are "historical
vestiges of the erroneous supposition that emperors, kings and
governments could effectively fix all prices;" 56 competition should be
allowed to determine the pricing of money and credit; and credit
50. Peterson, supra note 13, at 886 (citing KATHLEEN E. KEEST & GARY KLEIN, NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING 34 (3d ed. 1995)).
51. Id. at 889.
52. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168 (1980); Peterson, supra note 13, at 888-89. See generally
Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth:
Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 201-02 (2008).
53. RENUART & KEEST-TILA, supra note 43, at 3.
54. Id. at 4.
55. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1968) (approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws at its Annual Conference, July 22-August 1, 1968; approved by the American
Bar Association at Its Meeting, August 7, 1968; reprinted from COMMERCE CLEARINGHOUSE, NEW
RULES ON CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION 263 (1969) [hereinafter UCCC 1968]). See generally Robert
L. Jordan & William D. Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1968).
56. UCCC 1968, supra note 55, at 267.
1155
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grantors should have relatively easy entry into the market. 57 In regard
to enforcement, creditor rights and remedies should not be restricted
too much, and consumer rights and remedies should not be too great.
Otherwise those who were "less creditworthy" would be deprived "of
lawful sources of credit" and driven into the arms of loan sharks.
58
Consistent with these assumptions, the UCCC relies primarily on
competition to protect consumers from unreasonably high credit
costs, although it does contain rate ceilings.
59
Consumer advocates opposed the UCCC because they believed it
did not adequately protect consumers. More significant, however,
was the action they took to transform that dissatisfaction into positive
action. NCLC and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
(NLADA) co-sponsored a conference the first month NCLC began
operations. The conference was attended by 55 consumer experts
from around the country.60 The consensus of those present was that
NCLC should draft a substantial revision of the 1968 version of the
UCCC.
6 1
The NCLC's revision was called the National Consumer Act and
was published in 1970.62 Compared to the UCCC, the NCA is far
more protective of consumers and broader in scope. 6 3 No state
adopted the NCA in its totality, but Wisconsin enacted major portions
and other states passed individual provisions.64 More importantly,
when confronted with the contrast between the NCA and the UCCC,
most states refused to enact the UCCC. Only seven states adopted the
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See generally Jordan & Warren, supra note 55.
60. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT, FIRST FINAL DRAFT, at iii (1969),
available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/credit code-archive/content/
National%20Consumer/o2OAct.pdf [hereinafter NCA].
61. Id. at iv.
62. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION,
PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES 35 (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter RENUART & KEEST-CREDIT].
63. ROTHSCHILD & CARROLL, supra note 1, at 817-29. "[The NCA abolished the traditional
distinction between loans and credit sales, restricted security interests and credit insurance commissions,
and addressed credit bureau abuses and deceptive trade practices." RENUART & KEEST-CREDIT, supra
note 62, at 35.
64. ROTHSCHILD & CARROLL, supra note 1, at 816; RENUART & KEEST--CREDIT, supra note 62, at
35 n.182.
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1968 version. 65 The UCCC was revised to include greater protection
in 1974, but only four states adopted portions of it.66 The drafters of
the 1974 version acknowledged NCLC's two model statutes. 67 The
drafters also admitted that legal services attorneys had made them
aware of low income consumers' needs.
68
Perhaps as important as stopping the UCCC was the process
involved in this first effort at national consumer legislative advocacy.
As described above, in reaction to the UCCC, NCLC and NLADA
sponsored a conference of 55 experts who recommended drafting a
model act. In other words, the decision to draft the NCA was not
made by a few isolated individuals determining on their own what
was best for consumers. In addition, in drafting the NCA, NCLC
"relied heavily" on persons from major consumer organizations such
as Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, and the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund.69
One of the most significant developments on the state level starting
in 1965 was the enactment of laws modeled on the FTC Act that
prohibited unfair and deceptive acts and practices.7 ° Unlike the FTC
65. RENuART & KEEST-CREDIT, supra note 62, at 35.
66. Id. at 35. In 1973, NCLC published a successor to the NCA, the Model Consumer Credit Act.
ROTHSCHILD & CARROLL, supra note 1, at 816. The 1974 version of the UCCC "included stronger
,consumer oriented' provisions to assuage the concerns of consumer groups, such as the National
Consumer Law Center." Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Legislation, 44
EMORY L.J. 587, 636 n.161 (1995).
67. The Prefatory Note to the 1974 version reflects the drafters' hostility to NCLC's NCA and
MCCA, claiming they take "extreme consumer positions." UNIr. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE Prefatory
Note, at XVIII (1974) (Official 1974 Text with Comments) [hereinafter Prefatory Note].
68. "Information gained from legal services attorneys has thrown new light on the needs of poverty-
level consumers, but has also revealed that those needs cannot be met solely by consumer credit
legislation of general application." Id. at XVIII. The Prefatory Note to the 1974 version of the UCCC
reflects the drafters' hostility to NCLC's NCA and MCCA, claiming they take "extreme consumer
positions." Id. at XVII; see also Letsou, supra note 66, at 636 n.161 (stating that the 1974 revision of the
UCCC "included stronger 'consumer oriented' provisions to assuage the concerns of consumer groups
such as the National Consumer Law Center").
69. NCA, supra note 60, at iv. One of the co-drafters of the Wisconsin Consumer Act subsequently
became the Deputy Director of NCLC. Richard A. Elbrecht, The NCCUSL Should Abandon Its Search
for Consensus and Address More Difficult and Controversial Issues Applying 'Process' Concepts, 28
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 147, 174 n.a (1994). See generally Jeffrey Davis, Legislative Restrictions of Creditor
Power and Remedies: A Case Study of the Negotiation and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72
MICH. L. REv. 3 (1973) (comparing the Wisconsin Consumer Act with the UCCC and the NCLC's NCA
and MCCA); Thomas Crandell, The Wisconsin Consumer Act: Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before
and Afier, 1973 WiS. L. REv. 334 (1973).
70. GREENFIELD, supra note 12, at 160.
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Act, however, they authorized a private right of action, permitted
consumers to obtain injunctive relief, and provided for recovery of
damages. 7 1 Some of the statutes and some of the case law construing
the statutes, however, have restricted these laws by requiring actual
damages, a showing the consumer's lawsuit is in the "public
interest," and a notice or demand letter prior to commencing suit.
72
D. The Supreme Court Cases
Whereas TILA was the major victory in the federal legislative
realm, several Supreme Court cases established important principles
and stopped creditor practices that had been abusive to consumers.
The first major case, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., was brought
by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and decided in 1969, the same
year TILA became effective and NCLC was established.73 As noted
above, consumer lawyers started to become active in the milieu of the
civil rights movement.74 It is therefore fitting that the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, the main litigation arm of the civil rights movement,
was intimately connected to the first major consumer case before the
Supreme Court.75 Its involvement indicates that the NAACP believed
there was a close connection between civil rights and consumer
rights. An amicus brief was filed by Consumers Union, another
organization that has been an important participant in consumer law
reform efforts.76 In Sniadach, the Supreme Court struck down as
71. Id. at 161-62.
72. Donna S. Shapiro, The Georgia Fair Business Practices Act: Business As Usual, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 453, 456 (1993). See generally CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (7th ed. 2008).
73. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The NAACP Legal Defense
Fund also was involved in drafting NCLC's National Consumer Act. See supra text accompanying note
69.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
75. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund brought the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education.
Calvin William Sharpe, "Judging Good Faith, " Seeing Justice Marshall's Legacy Through a Labor
Case, 26 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 479, 479-82 (1994) (noting that Thurgood Marshall represented the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund in the Brown case); see JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM, A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 27 (1978) (stating that the Legal Services
program's law reform effort was modeled on that of the NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
76. Lexis version of the case notes that Consumers Union filed an amicus brief. Consumers Union is
the publisher of CONSUMER REPORTS; see www.consumersunion.org.
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violating due process Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment law that
permitted a creditor to obtain a court order freezing a consumer's
wages absent prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. Prejudgment
garnishment deprived the consumer of the chance to assert a defense
such as the creditor's fraud 77 and could result in "tremendous
hardship" for a worker with a family.
78
Sniadach was followed by a series of due process cases. Offices
funded by the Legal Services program brought much of this litigation
and NCLC filed amicus briefs.79 Although the Supreme Court
initially used broad language to strike down seizures on due process
grounds, it subsequently narrowed its rulings somewhat.8 0 Moreover,
self-help seizures survived due process challenges due to a lack of
state action. 81 Never again, however, could a creditor obtain a writ of
replevin to seize a consumer's car or furniture without prior notice
and an opportunity for a hearing at which the creditor must establish
the probable validity of the underlying claim against the consumer.
Sniadach and its progeny continued to be followed as comparable
types of statutes were struck down many years later.
82
The Supreme Court also decided cases that upheld the Federal
Reserve Board's (FRB) authority to issue regulations pursuant to
TILA. This has proven to be a two-edged sword for consumers. TILA
provides that creditors have to make various disclosures in
77. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339.
78. Id. at 340. The Court found support in the evidence and conclusions of congressional hearings on
garnishment. Id. at 340-41.
79. See, e.g., Craft v. Memphis Gas, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (recognizing utility service as a
"necessity of modem life" and requiring hearing prior to termination of service); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant,
416 U.S. 600, 630-36 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (restricting the holding in Fuentes); Jackson v.
Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 363--64 (1974) (holding termination of utility service violates due
process); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97-98 (1972) (holding prejudgment replevin statutes violate
due process); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 206 (1972), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1049 (1972)
(dismissing on procedural grounds a challenge to confession of judgment). "It is because social-reform
groups lack the power to seek their demands through normal political processes or through direct action
that they turn to [the courts] for help. Courts have always been used by those who find the balance of
political forces against them. The powerless seek to neutralize inequities in bargaining power or at least
to extract some concessions from their opponents." HANDLER, supra note 75, at 22.
80. See Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 617-18.
81. Lawrence A. Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893 (1975).
82. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180, 182 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (striking down replevin law
and citing Fuentes), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
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transactions in which they impose a finance charge.83 Creditors could
easily avoid these requirements simply by not stating any finance
charge in their documents. The FRB, reasoning that any transaction
in which the consumer can defer payment for more than a short
period of time must contain a hidden finance charge which is buried
in the price of the goods, issued its "four installment rule." That
regulation triggers the TILA disclosure requirements, not only when
there is a stated finance charge, but also if the consumer may pay in
more than four installments.84 In Mourning v. Family Publications
Service, Inc.,85 the Supreme Court upheld the FRB's power to issue
the regulation, holding that when Congress grants an administrative
agency general authority to promulgate regulations, as it had in
TILA, the regulations should be upheld as long as they are reasonably
86
related to the purposes of the statute.
The case is important because it reflects the FRB's early
determination to close loopholes that may have been lurking through
Congress's failure to use more precise language in this first-of-its-
kind federal legislation. The FRB's aggressive stance is significant
because when Congress was considering TILA legislation, the FRB
was less than enthusiastic about being the agency delegated the
responsibility for issuing regulations pursuant to TILA.87
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1969).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1982). The rationale for the rule is explained in Mourning v. Family
Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 366 (1973).
85. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 356.
86. Id. at 369.
87. Hearings Before Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Committee on Banking & Currency, 90th
Cong. 666-67 (1967) (statement of J.L. Robertson, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) (noting that its familiarity with the trade practices subject to TILA was "very limited,"
that considering those practices would leave it with less time to formulate monetary policy, that its
experience in setting monetary policy had not prepared it to implement TILA with regulations, that it
had no trained staff to determine if there were compliance with its regulations, and that if Congress
nevertheless designated the FRB to issue regulations, it hoped that "in time" Congress would reassign
that role "to an agency better suited to perform the function"). Forty years after TILA became effective,
President Obama proposed to grant the FRB its wish by establishing a Consumer Financial Protection
Agency that would have sole rule-making authority under TILA. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FNANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
58, available at http://financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReportweb.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010);
see infra text accompanying notes 328-350. Two years later, after TILA had already been enacted, the
FRB voiced similar reservations when asked whether it would be the appropriate agency to draft
regulations if Congress restricted the mailing of unsolicited credit cards in TILA. Hearings Before
[Vol. 26:41160
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The facts in the Mourning case illustrate one of the typical types of
largely unregulated transactions that had been plaguing consumers.
The consumer, Leila Mourning, was 73 years old. 88 A door-to-door
salesman sold her five year subscriptions to four magazines. The total
cost was $122.44, payable in 30 monthly payments in addition to a
down payment. The contract did not state a finance charge and
contained none of the TILA disclosures. It provided that if the
consumer missed any payment, the entire sum became due. Perhaps
realizing she had made a bad bargain, or perhaps because she could
not afford the payments, Mourning defaulted and the magazine
service sent her dunning letters.
The case was typical in that the consumer was elderly, the
marketing was done in the consumer's home where the consumer
might well be alone and would feel vulnerable, and the amount of the
transaction was small. 89 Because of the small amount, the transaction
costs of challenging the transaction would be prohibitive in terms of
time and expense. Most lawyers would not even consider taking a
case where so little money was involved.90
As a result of the FRB's "four installment rule," magazine services
such as the one involved in Mourning are required to make various
disclosures to consumers. One might question, however, whether
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Committee on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong. 28 (1969)
(statement of Andrew Brimmer, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System) (testifying that the FRB
should authorize an agency "that is much closer to the consumer protection problem rather than
assigning it to the Federal Reserve Board"). The FRB, however, refused to recommend the FTC as an
appropriate agency. Id. When Congress considered regulating credit bureaus, the Senate bill granted the
FRB authority to issue regulations. The FRB's Vice Chairman told the Senate the FRB was "not
prepared to assume" that responsibility. Hearings Before Subcomm. on Financial Institutions,
Committee on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong. 26 (1969) (statement of J.L. Robertson, Vice Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (testifying that "[t]he functions vested in the Board
by the Truth in Lending Act should not be taken as a precedent for assigning to the Board wide-ranging
duties in the general area of consumer protection," and furthermore, such duties are "inconsistent" with
its monetary policy responsibilities).
88. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 358.
89. See Arizona v. Direct Sellers Ass'n, 494 P.2d 361, 363 (Ariz. 1972) (quoting from a
congressional committee report describing the characteristics of door-to-door selling that make it
susceptible to abusive selling); Phuong Cat Le, Should You Open the Door? Story of Salesman Sparks
Fears, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 15, 2007, at B1, available at 2007 WLNR 18163311
(describing aggressive behavior of door-to-door salespeople); Byron D. Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period
in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1968).
90. Muhammad v. County Bank, 912 A.2d 88, 99 (N.J. 2006).
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those disclosures would have made any difference in Mourning's
decision to purchase the magazines. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) investigated door-to-door sales and found rampant abuses. 91
The pervasiveness of the unfair practices was crucial to justifying its
regulation of the industry since the amount involved in most cases
was small. The FTC apparently thought more was necessary to
protect consumers than TILA's disclosures. Its door-to-door sales
rule requires such sellers to give consumers three days to cancel their
purchases.92
The consumer's legal representation in the Mourning case also is
noteworthy. One of the law offices representing the consumer was
the Legal Services Senior Citizen Center, which received funding
from the Legal Services program of OEO.93 Before the Supreme
Court, the consumer was represented by lawyers from the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, the same civil rights organization that
represented the consumers in Fuentes94 and that brought the Sniadach
case.95 NCLC submitted an amicus brief.96 The magazine service was
hardly out-gunned, however. Three law firms represented it,
including Cravath, Swaine & Moore. 97 This illustrates another aspect
of the development of consumer law: creditors have been well-
91. J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial Activism or
Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 347, 356 (1992).
92. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2009).
93. Brief for Petitioner, Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., No. 71-829 (5th Cir. July 31, 1972),
1972 WL 136302 (listing the Legal Services Senior Citizens Center as representing the petitioner). E-
mail from Leonard Helfand, former counsel for the Legal Services Senior Citizens Center, to author
(Nov. 4, 2009) (confirming that the Legal Services Senior Citizens Center received funding from the
Legal Services program of OEO).
94. The consumer's brief in Fuentes lists Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, and Eric Schnapper.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93. At that time, they were on the staff of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund. Legends in the Law, A Conversation with James M Nabritt III,
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/resources/legends in the law/nabrit.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2009)
(appeared in THE WASHINGTON LAWYER, July-Aug. 2001); Jack Greenberg's Biography for Columbia
Law School, http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/JackGreenberg (last visited Sept. 24, 2009); Eric
Schnapper's Biography for University of Washington School of Law,
http://www.law.washington.edu/directory/Profile.aspx?UDl=155 (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
95. See supra text accompanying note 73.
96. Brief for Mourning as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv.,
Inc., No. 71-829 (5th Cir. June 16, 1972), 1972 WL 136305. The author was one of NCLC's lawyers on
the brief.
97. Brief for the Respondent, Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., No. 71-829 (5th Cir. Sept. 2,
1972), 1972 WL 136303.
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represented. Hiring firms such as Cravath illustrates how important
the industry views these issues.
In the past it was highly unlikely that a consumer in Leila
Mourning's situation would be able to obtain legal representation at
all, much less legal counsel all the way to the Supreme Court. TILA,
however, provides that a successful consumer may recover costs and
attorney's fees. 98 The prospect of collecting costs and fees provided
an incentive for some lawyers to take cases like Mourning's,
especially if they could be brought as class actions. Subsequent
developments, however, have substantially reduced the viability of
this incentive.
99
Although the legal rule of deference to administrative agency
regulation preserved the protections of TILA in Mourning, that rule
does not always work in the consumer's favor. For example, in Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin the Court upheld an FRB regulation
over consumer objections that TILA required a stronger rule.' 00 The
Court ruled that agencies like the FRB possess expertise that courts
lack and consequently courts should uphold their regulations unless
they are "demonstrably irrational."'' In contrast to the "four
installment rule," which expanded the scope of the term "finance
charge," the FRB subsequently has steadily narrowed the definition
of what is included in that term.' 
02
98. 15 U.S.C. 1640 (2006).
99. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 158-70. Due to mandatory arbitration, legal
representation in such cases is now far less likely, although recent developments have possibly made
mandatory arbitration less pervasive. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 171-75. Moreover,
for many years, offices funded by the Legal Services Corporation were not permitted to accept
attorney's fees, even when awarded by the court pursuant to a statute expressly permitting them.
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 504(a)(7),
504(a)(13), 110 Stat. 1321, 1353-54 (1996). See infra note 135.
100. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 570 (1980); see HANDLER, supra note 75, at
23 (noting that "[a]gencies are usually hostile to the claims of social-reform groups" and can "thwart the
will of the courts"). Nevertheless, agencies are an essential part of any enforcement effort because
"[c]ourts become almost impotent when confronted with supervising difficult problems of enforcement,"
but can effectively enforce the law if the court does not need to "defer to agency discretion" and can
merely award damages or issue an injunction. Id. at 24-25.
101. Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 565.
102. Renuart & Thompson, supra note 52, at 202-03.
1163
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1163 2009-2010
0]  ER   
 nn t 
 tr    . 
  
'    t tion  
    
,  l r r  
 t    
  
  t 
  f 
i ti .99 
  
i    ing,  
'  .   
 it .  lli    
r  L  10   
  
   
l  i al.,,101 t  
t ,    nn  
,"  l    
is i cl e  in that term.102 
. . .  
 
   
 i  .  
 t  itt   
  . 
.  ,  ,  ).  . );    ies    
ill  t  t . t l , i    ti l t   t t  
  rts   t,  
t  ti l   t  l   t  t  t  t   t   i ti    
  . d.  
. il lli ,  . . t . 
 ra  ... {)3. 
17
Budnitz: The Development of Consumer Protection Law, The Institutionalizat
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
E. The Role of Federal Administrative Agencies
During the formative years of consumer protection law, federal
administrative agencies played an important role in many areas in
addition to the FRB's role in TILA. The FRB has issued regulations
pursuant to the Electronic Fund Transfers Act,10 3 the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 104 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.10 5 From the
standpoint of consumer advocates, the FRB's role has been mixed, as
the Mourning and Milhollin cases illustrate. Sometimes the FRB
issues regulations that strengthen consumers' positions, and
sometimes its actions do the opposite.
The FTC also has played a crucial role. Long moribund, in 1969,
the same year NCLC was established and TILA became effective, the
Nixon administration reorganized the FTC in order to make it far
more active in combating unfair and deceptive practices. 106 Congress
soon granted the FTC broad rulemaking authority10 7 which the FTC
used to issue several wide-ranging regulations. 10 8 It also became
more aggressive in its efforts to enforce the FTC Act.'0 9
No matter how greatly the FTC might have wished to enforce the
law, however, its resources were limited to whatever amounts
Congress appropriated and had to be shared with the FTC's anti-trust
responsibilities. Furthermore, the scope of its authority is restricted to
enforcement actions in the public interest. 110 Consequently, it was
crucial to consumer protection that statutes such as TILA include
103. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2009).
104. Id. pt. 202.
105. See, e.g., id. pt. 232.
106. RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF
Two AGENCIES 166-67 (2d ed. 1996); Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC's Consumer Protection Program
During the Miller Years: Lessons for Administrative Agency Structure and Operation, 46 CATH. U. L.
REv. 371, 375-76 (1997).
107. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88
Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l) (2006)); see HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 106, at
172-73.
108. E.g., Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 444 (2009), Funeral Industry Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R.
pt. 453.1 (2009); Holder Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (2009); Door-to-Door Sales, 16 C.F.R. pt. 429.1 (2009).
109. HARRIS& MILKIS, supra note 106, at 181.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006).
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provisions to facilitate individual lawsuits such as a private right of
action, actual and statutory damages, and attorney fees.Il
III. GROWING PAINS: CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW TAKES A HIT
During the Reagan administration and continuing into the Carter
administration, the political climate shifted and there were several
developments that severely obstructed the expansion of consumer
protection law. On the legislative front, the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 deregulated interest
rates for an entire segment of the consumer credit market.' 12 A
second law, the Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act
imposed further deregulation."1 3 A third setback was the extensive
revision of TILA. Legal services lawyers and lawyers from the
private bar often brought cases under TILA on behalf of their low
income clients. 114 Although the FRB had found that as a result of
TILA consumers were much more aware of the cost of credit,
Congress was concerned that there were too many disclosures and it
was too difficult for creditors to comply with TILA's complex
regulatory scheme. 115 Consequently, Congress passed the Truth in
Lending Simplification and Reform Act in 1980.116 That law reduced
the number of required disclosures and limited the liability of
creditors who did not comply with the reduced requirements. 117 in
order to make compliance less onerous for creditors, TILA was
amended again in 1995.118
111. 1d.§ 1640.
112. Peterson, supra note 13, at 873; Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 prohibited the states from
imposing interest rate maximums on home and mobile home first mortgages. Peterson, supra note 13, at
873; see RENUART & KEEST-CREDIT, supra note 62, at 123-25.
113. 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (2006); see RENUART & KEEST-TILA, supra note 43, at 37.
114. RENUART & KEEST-TILA, supra note 43, at 5.
115. Id. at5-6.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006); see also sources cited supra note 52.
117. RENUART & KEEST-TILA, supra note 43, at 7.
118. Id. at 8-9.
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In light of the Obama administration proposal to establish a
Consumer Financial Protection Agency, 119 it is relevant to note
Congress's defeat in 1978 of a bill to create a consumer advocacy
agency to be called the Department of Consumers.' 20 The Department
would "monitor the activities of other government agencies and
intervene in their regulatory decision-making.' 2 1 It would not
regulate specific abuses. The bill was defeated despite "nine years of
effort by one of the largest and most active consumer coalitions in
history."' 122 One reason the bill was not passed was that it served as a
catalyst for the first coalition of business interests to oppose a
consumer protection bill.1
23
There also were setbacks in the courts, especially the Supreme
Court's treatment of state interest rate regulation. In Marquette v.
First of Omaha Service Corp. the Supreme Court held that the
interest rate cap set by credit card law of a national bank's home state
controlled, not the cap set by the law of the consumer's state.
124
Consequently, a national bank could "export" the home state's caps
to the consumer's state. As a result, national banks moved their credit
card operations to those states with no caps, and some states repealed
their caps in order to entice issuers to move their operations to their
states.125 In Smiley v. Citibank, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) that defined
"interest" very broadly. 1
26
The major federal agency charged with protecting consumers, the
FTC, contributed to the era's consumer protection retrenchment. As
noted above, 127 in the early 1970s the FTC had issued several wide-
ranging regulations. Whereas litigation by the FTC targets one
company at a time, a regulation can have an impact on an entire
119. See infra notes 328-50.
120. HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 11.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Marquette v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978).
125. Peterson, supra note 13, at 873.
126. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 735-36 (1996).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
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industry. Therefore, it can be far more efficient and effective. Under
the Reagan administration, however, the FTC's budget was cut
drastically 128 and the FTC stopped proposing new regulations.' 29 It
also brought fewer cases. 130 The FTC Act authorizes the FTC to stop
"unfair and deceptive acts and practices."' 13 1 The FTC redefined
"deceptive" during the Reagan administration; one dissenting FTC
Commissioner complained the new definition would undermine
consumer protection. 132 Congress also amended the FTC Act to ban
certain types of FTC investigations and provide more Congressional
control over FTC activities. 
133
There also were serious threats to the legal services lawyers who
were handling the problems of low income consumers. Funding for
legal services was cut drastically, forcing those legal services lawyers
still employed to handle only emergency cases, often refusing to take
any consumer matters.' 34  Moreover, most legal services offices
128. HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 106, at 189-97.
129. Budnitz, supra note 106, at 413.
130. Id. at 393-95.
131. The FTC can issue cease and desist orders, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2), (b) (2006), and can request that
a court issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006).
132. Budnitz, supra note 106, at 396-99. The new definition was applied in the FTC's cases. E.g., In
re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
133. Mark V. Nadel, Congress and Consumer Protection, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONSUMER
MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 126, 128.
134. See generally ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 29-30 (2007),
http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0158.pdf (describing how the budget cuts in the early
1980s resulted in closed offices, fired staff, and a substantial reduction in the level of services); William
P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services
Corporation from the 1960s to the 1990s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241,257, 259 (1998) (reporting
that in the 1980s LSC funding was greatly reduced and services were limited); Deborah L. Rhode,
Access to Justice, TRIAL, Jan. 2006, at 48, 48 (attributing the ineffectiveness of legal assistance to the
poor to "long-standing ideological and structural constraints"). Legal services offices have continued to
face serious challenges. For example, in 2009, 105 members of the U.S. House voted to eliminate the
Legal Services Corporation, the primary funding source for legal services offices throughout the country
(eleven did not vote). Press Release, Legal Services Corporation, House Approves $440 million for LSC
(June 18, 2009), http://www.lsc.gov/press/pressreleasedetail_2009_T248_R15.php. Although the effort
failed when 323 representatives voted against this proposal, it is significant that almost a quarter of the
House was in favor of this drastic measure at a time when the country was in the midst of its worst
economic crisis since the Depression. Moreover, the House retained significant restrictions on funding.
See infra note 135. The current economic recession has increased the number of persons eligible for
assistance by legal aid offices by II million, but the programs will not have adequate funds to handle
more than one-half of those who request assistance. Tony Pugh, Crush of New Clients Swamp Legal
1167
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1167 2009-2010
]       
r ,   i t .  
   t   
ly 128     
1   
 t es.130     
"unfair and deceptive acts and practices.,,131  i  
tive"  i ; i   
i er    ti   
r 
  ed     
i   i tions   l 
l r F  activities.133 
    ts l s   
  s  .   
i s  t ll ,    s  
    ,  i    
er .
134 ,  i s s 
, ra . 
itz,  6, t  
!d. . 
.   
   
  
 liff l  ., .,  . . .  ). 
. ess r t ction,  
,   
r l     ,  
s I    
1asp.org/adminlsitelpublicationslfileslOI58.pdf    
  ,  ti l  i     i ; illi  
    e i s 
tionjr   , o u v ,  )  
   
 t  tice, I , . , t ,  ( ttri ti  t  i ff ti  f l l i t  t  t  
t ing   l t i t . l i  i   ti  t  
,   
  ti ,  i  i    l l i  ffi  t r t t  tr  
, ti ,  
, l _detail_2 09_T248_RI5.php.   
t ti es t  
  im  
    . , t   t i  i ifi t r tri ti   f i . 
 i      
11  t  t   t  l  
 lf  sh    
21
Budnitz: The Development of Consumer Protection Law, The Institutionalizat
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
received at least some of their funding from the Legal Services
Corporation, the successor to OEO, and the statute authorizing that
funding was amended to prohibit legal services offices from bringing
class actions or accepting an award for attorney fees. The amendment
also restricted activities LSC offices could engage in even with non-
LSC money.' 35 LSC funding for NCLC was terminated in 1995.136
IV. ONE CENTURY ENDS, ANOTHER BEGINS: No DRAMA FROM THE
BUSHES OR CLINTON
There were no dramatic consumer protection developments during
the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. 137 During
George W. Bush's presidency consumers suffered two major
setbacks. One was passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005.138 That statute had the effect of
"radically limiting access to (and increasing the cost of obtaining) a
bankruptcy discharge."' 139 Second, the Office of Comptroller of the
Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision aggressively asserted
Aid: Recession Means More Poor, Jobless Are Seeking Help, MODESTO BEE (Cal.), July 12, 2009, at
A4, available at 2009 WLNR 13345424.
135. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§ 504(a)(7), (13), 110 Stat. 1321, 1353-54 (1996). In 2010, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 1 1-117, 123 Stat. 3034, amended the Legal Services Corporation Act to remove the
restrictions on LSC-funded offices receiving attorney's fees. See Legal Services Corporation
Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 6816, 6816 (Feb. 11, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 1609, 1610, and
1642).
136. HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 19.
137. See id. at 12 (acknowledging, however, that President George H.W. Bush made "several strong
appointments to regulatory agencies" and Clinton lost his Democratic majority in Congress before he
developed priorities for consumer protection issues).
138. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 12, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
139. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality,
Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform " of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1481, 1481 (2006);
see Peter Alexander, Another Perspective: The Bankruptcy Code Harms Women and Children, 15
WIDENER L.J. 599, 605 (2006) (predicting that fewer attorneys will take cases as a result of the
bankruptcy amendments); Henry Sommer, Trying to Make Sense out of Nonsense: Representing
Consumers Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 191, 211 (2005) (predicting general practitioners will stop taking cases as a result of the
bankruptcy amendments, posing access difficulties for consumers in small towns and rural areas).
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their right to preempt state law intended to protect consumers of
financial services.
1 40
V. THE CHALLENGES OF THE 2 1 ST CENTURY: CONTRACTS AND
TECHNOLOGY'S Two EDGED SWORD
The ability of the law to effectively protect consumers is being
seriously tested by current developments, most of which began in the
last century, and several of which were made possible by advances in
technology. 14 1 These include the ways in which contracts are written,
the unfair terms they include, and the means by which consumers
agree to be bound by them. One of those terms, the mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clause, has been especially significant because it
cuts off access to the courts. Once an agreement has been made,
thanks to technology, consumers have new types of payment systems
and devices with which to pay. Technology also facilitated
securitization of mortgages, contributing to the present economic
crisis. While these new developments pose opportunities for the
exploitation of consumers, technology also has given consumers
convenient ways to shop and bank as well as new tools for making
sound purchasing decisions.
Despite the many state and federal statutes that have been enacted
in the last forty years to regulate consumer transactions, the
underlying contract between the company and the consumer remains
crucial in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties. One key
element is the courts' effective elimination of the concept of
agreement. There is no "meeting of the minds"; the consumer never
140. WookBai Kim, Challenging the Roots of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The OCC's Operating
Subsidiary Regulations and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 278, 285-88
(2009). Not all of the agencies' actions have been to the detriment of consumers, however. Angela
Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis: Would Credit Card Regulations Force Low-Income
Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending Alternatives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 418 (2009) (reporting
that OCC has issued a directive having the effect of preventing payday lenders from taking advantage of
federal preemption to avoid enforcement of state law).
141. See STAFF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE NEXT
TECH-ADE 2 (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/P064101tech.pdf [hereinafter Tech-ade Report]
(observing that changes are "taking place at a dizzying pace").
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agrees to the contract terms. 142 Rather, contracts are written in
language few could ever hope to understand 143 and the contracts are
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 144 In many situations, courts
enforce contracts and changes in contract terms as long as the
company notified the consumer and the consumer continued her
relationship with the company, such as continuing to use her credit
card, or continuing to maintain her account with the bank. 145 Notice
has replaced agreement as a crucial element of contract formation.
Developments in technology have been a significant factor in
changing the law of contracts, especially with many consumer
transactions taking place on the Internet. Contracting on-line has
presented many issues. A fundamental one is the basic question of
whether a contract has been formed. When consumers buy goods or
services on-line they are presented with various scenarios for entering
into contracts. 146 In some of these settings, the contract is displayed
on an internal page on the seller's site, but the consumer is not
required to engage in affirmative conduct to indicate an intention to
enter into a contract. 147  The courts have not resolved issues
surrounding the validity of these "browsewrap" or "click free"
contracts.148 Other sites use a contracting process called clickwrap in
which the consumer is required to click on some part of a web page
142. Amelia Rawls, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REV. 200,
217-20 (2009) (contending that new technologies make the "meeting of the minds" doctrine "moot");
Jay P. Kason & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science
and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 607 (2006) (arguing that there is no meeting
of the minds in consumer contracts).
143. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
233, 233 (2002).
144. Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons for
Standard Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393, 396-97 (2003);
Francis J. Mootz I1, After the Battle of the Forms: Commercial Contracting in the Electronic Age, 4 J.L.
& POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 271, 303 n.42 (2008); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The
Case for Using "Knowing Assent'" As the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form
Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469,485-86 (2008).
145. Tsadilas v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that
consumer is bound by contract term where she continued to use credit card).
146. Mark E. Budnitz, Consumers Surfing for Sales in Cyberspace: What Constitutes Acceptance and
What Legal Terms and Conditions Bind the Consumer?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 741, 744-51 (2000).
147. Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
148. Compare ProCd, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), with Step-Saver Data Sys.,
Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
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indicating assent, but it is not clear consumers understand the click
constitutes a legally binding assent.
Even if a contract has been formed on-line, many questions persist
as to what terms are included in the contract and what terms are
merely proposals offered by the company. Courts enforce "rolling" or
"layered" contracts in which consumers are informed of crucial terms
only after they purchase goods or services. 149 Questions arise as to
the proper method of binding consumers to later modifications of the
terms.150
Another issue concerns the contents of the terms contained in
contracts, whether on-line or off-line. Examples of terms that courts
have struck down include arbitration agreements charging excessive
fees, 151  cross-collateral provisions,1 52  and waiver of defense
clauses. 153 While those terms often are clearly disclosed in consumer
contracts, others are what Professor Alces calls "guerilla terms"
because they are "shrouded."' 54 That is, the seller hides "the true and
complete cost of a purchase."' 155 Examples include credit card
companies concealing terms in the mathematical figures they
disclose, 156 and allocating payments in a manner that the consumer
will not understand. 157 As discussed in Part VH, Congress objected to
several types of contract terms used by credit card issuers and placed
restrictions on them in the Credit Card Act of 2009.
A contract term that has been very controversial is the mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clause. 158  These clauses have become
149. See generally Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCd, Inc., 86 F.3d
1447; Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts As an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679.
150. John J.A. Burke, Contract As Commodity: A Notification Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
285, 322 (2000).
151. Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958 (W.D. Va. 2000).
152. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cit. 1965).
153. Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
154. Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511, 1513 (2007).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1552.
157. Id. at 1512. Professor Alces gives the example of the allocation of payments when the consumer
does not pay the full amount due and has balances both from a previous balance transfer from another
account and a current balance.
158. Richard M. Alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act: It's All About
Separation of Powers, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151, 151 (2009). Forcing consumers to litigate their
cases in arbitration administered by private companies is an example of the privatization of the law.
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pervasive in most consumer transactions. 159 The clauses have been
attacked on the bases that: arbitration often is more expensive than
litigation; 160 typically the clauses ban class actions making it
infeasible for consumers to challenge illegal conduct; 161 arbitration
services are biased in favor of companies; 162  and arbitration is
private, shielding companies from public scrutiny.' 63 While many
courts have struck down the clauses or parts of them as being
unconscionable,' 64 many other courts have upheld the clauses.1
65
Arbitration clauses also can be challenged on two more
fundamental grounds. First, arbitrators are not required to follow the
law.' 66 Therefore, all of the laws that have been enacted in the past
forty years to protect consumers can be completely ignored by
arbitrators and there is nothing the consumer can do about it, since
that is not a basis for challenging an arbitrator's decision. In fact,
arbitrators are not required to make any written findings of fact or
rulings of law. 167  Second, arbitration is an example of the
privatization of the law. Consumer protection laws to a significant
extent took consumer transactions out of the world of private contract
Another example is the rules that govern much of the electronic payment systems, rules issued by the
National Automated Clearinghouse Association. 2009 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO RULES &
REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK (2009). See generally Stewart Macaulay, Private
Government, in LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 445 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986); David J.
Kenney, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231 (1998); Steven L.
Schwarcz, A Funda~mental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV.
909 (1995); David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003).
159. Alderman, supra note 158.
160. Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 133, 133 (2004).
161. Alderman, supra note 158, at 154.
162. Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions on Corporate Misconduct and
Laws Regulating Corporations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008); see
infra text accompanying note 171.
163. Daniel R. Higginbotham, Buyer Beware: Why the Class Arbitration Waiver Clause Presents a
Gloomy Future for Consumers, 58 DUKE L.J. 103, 112 (2008).
164. E.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, 379 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding
arbitration clause unconscionable because of non-mutuality).
165. E.g., Stenzell v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133 (Me. 2005) (holding non-mutual arbitration contract not
unconscionable under Texas law).
166. Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, and Clarifying
Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 1.
167. David L. Heinemann, Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 553 (1986).
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by requiring disclosures and notices, out of which the parties could
not contract. These requirements could be enforced by statutes which
encouraged enforcement in the public forum of the courts by
providing for the award of attorney's fees, costs, and class actions.
Arbitration pulls consumer transactions into the nether world of
private dispute resolution where the only rules are those the
companies and the arbitration services the companies select adopt at
their pleasure, without consumer involvement or government
oversight.
Use of arbitration clauses represents a clever strategy by
companies to gain the upper hand by changing "the rules under which
the battle is fought."'168 Before their inclusion in consumer contracts,
companies faced lawsuits, often class actions, brought by an
increasing number of ever more experienced consumer lawyers. By
forcing consumers into arbitration, companies were able to obtain a
far more favorable forum.' 69 They furthered their escape from
significant liability by including a ban on class actions in their
arbitration clauses. 1
70
Dramatic changes occurred in 2009 when the Attorney General of
Minnesota sued the National Arbitration Forum (NAF). The Attorney
General's Complaint alleged that NAF violated state law when it did
not disclose that it had financial ties to law firms that brought debt
collection actions against consumers in NAF administered
arbitrations. 171
NAF promptly reached a settlement with the Attorney General's
office in which NAF agreed to stop administering all consumer
168. See generally Stephen Meili, Consumer Cause Lawyers in the United States: Lawyers for the
Movement or a Movement unto Themselves?, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 120, 128
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006). Meili uses federal preemption as his example of
companies changing the rules.
169. See JOHN O'DONNEL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf.
170. Alderman, supra note 158, at 154.
171. Evan Tager, National Arbitration Forum to Cease Administering Consumer Arbitrations: Many
Consumer Arbitration Provisions May Need Revision, MONDAQ, July 31, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 14806599.
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disputes. 172 Shortly thereafter the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) announced it would no long administer consumer debt
collection disputes until it addressed several concerns. 73
NAF's decision to stop handling consumer arbitrations left many
questions that will have to be resolved in the future. For example,
how will disputes be decided if a contract designates only the NAF as
the arbitration service? 174
The larger issue is: what is the future of consumer arbitration? Will
the decisions by NAF and AAA result in companies no longer trying
to enforce arbitration provisions in their contracts? Will a new
arbitration service be established that companies substitute for NAF
and AAA? If so, will that service insist on handling arbitration only if
the companies' contracts omit provisions consumer advocates and
some courts have found most objectionable? Is there any need for
federal legislation banning consumer arbitration?
175
The Internet poses many new challenges for consumers. In
addition to facing fraud and deceptive practices similar to those in
off-line transactions, consumers confront new challenges such as
phishing in which consumers unwittingly provide thieves with
information that can result in identity theft and unauthorized access to
consumer bank accounts. 176 The Internet also enables fraudsters to
172. Lewis Weiner, NAF Announces It Will No Longer Arbitrate Consumer Disputes, and AAA
Comes TumblingAfter, MONDAQ, Aug. 13, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 15739960.
173. Id.; Arbitration or Arbitrary: The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts,
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government
Reform, 1 IIth Cong. (2009) (testimony of Richard W. Naimark on behalf of the American Arbitration
Association). The AAA identified the following concerns: consumers do not receive adequate notice of
proceedings; arbitrators may not be neutral, especially if the same arbitrator hears many cases; claimants
often present no proof of their claims; claimants seek interest charges and attorney fees that exceed the
amount of the claimed debt; and arbitrators may not adequately consider consumer defenses and
counterclaims. Id. at 5-7. Shortly thereafter Bank of America stopped requiring consumer arbitration.
Samuel Estreicher & Steven C. Bennett, Class Action Procedures in Arbitration, 242 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2009).
JPMorgan Chase subsequently announced it would no longer include mandatory arbitration provisions
in its credit card contracts. J.P. Morgan Drops Card-Dispute Arbitration Rule, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21,
2009, at B2.
174. Ten Stunning Practice Implications of NAF Withdrawal from All Consumer Arbitrations, NCLC
REPORTS (DECEPTIVE PRACTICES & WARRANTIES EDITION), July-Aug. 2009, at 1.
175. See infra text accompanying note 342.
176. "Phishing" typically involves consumers receiving an e-mail that appears to be from a legitimate
financial institution. If the consumer responds to instructions in the e-mail, he or she is taken to a web
site, asked for personal information, and soon becomes a victim to thieves who access bank accounts
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gain electronic access to consumers' bank accounts through hacking,
resulting in the potential for unauthorized transfers. 7 7 In addition, the
Internet enables lenders to structure transactions in a way that
increases consumer expenses. 17  At the same time, the Internet has
the potential of enabling consumer organizations to reach consumers
in new and effective ways. 179 In addition, consumers can achieve a
beneficial level of anonymity by transacting business on the Internet.
For example, if the consumer's name is Mary Smith, the Web seller
likely will not know the consumer's race or ethnicity, making
discrimination on those bases impossible. Some types of businesses,
however, may be able to use the Internet's capabilities and data about
the consumer to practice discrimination.180
New types of payment devices also are being developed. The 21st
Century has witnessed greatly reduced use of checks and a huge
increase in the use of stored value cards such as gift cards, prepaid
spending cards, phone cards, and payroll cards.' 81 These cards
provide benefits for consumers. For example, consumers who cannot
qualify for a credit card or who do not have a bank account can use a
and steal one's identity. Fed. Deposit Insurance Corp., Phishing Scams,
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/alerts/phishing.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
177. FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., PUTTING AN END TO ACCOUNT-HUACKING IDENTITY THEFT
(2004), http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheflstudy/identity theft.pdf. According to the
FDIC report, in a 12-month period, almost two million U.S. Internet users experienced unauthorized
access to their checking accounts. Seventy percent of these consumers did their banking or bill-paying
online. In one scheme, the cyber thieves not only made fraudulent transfers from consumer accounts,
they also prevented those transfers from appearing on the consumers' bank statements and transferred
random amounts that escaped detection by banks' fraud detection systems. Daniel Wolfe & Steve Bills,
Trickier Trojan, AM. BANKER, Oct. 7, 2009, at 5, available at 2009 WLNR 19703672.
178. E.g., PaycheckToday.com, http-//www.paychecktoday.com, in which the on-line lender
automatically renews the consumer's loan, debiting only the "finance fee" unless the consumer notifies
the lender three business days prior to the due date that he/she wants to pay the loan in full or pay down
part of the principal (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
179. Consumer Movement Faces Challenges, Opportunities, CFA NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 2
(reporting that the Internet provides opportunities for consumer organizations to connect with consumers
and for consumers to connect with each other, and share their experiences).
180. See, e.g., Joyce Cutler, Advocacy Group, Claiming Web Bias, Raises New Claims Against Wells
Fargo, 74 BNA BANKING REP. 1168 (2000) (reporting that the Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now alleged in a lawsuit that Wells Fargo used a search feature on its Web
site and information about consumers' current ZIP codes to steer consumers to neighborhoods in a
discriminatory manner).
181. Eniola Akindemowo, Contract, Deposit or E- Value? Reconsidering Stored Value Products for a
Modernized Payments Framework, 7 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 275, 275 (2009).
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prepaid spending card instead. Stored value cards look like credit and
debit cards and may even bear a Visa or MasterCard logo.
Consequently, it is reasonable for consumers to assume the federal
laws that protect them, such as laws that place limits on their liability
for lost and stolen credit and debit cards, apply to stored value
cards. 8 2 Until 2009, however, only payroll cards were subject to
federal protection; in 2009 gift cards were subject to limited federal
regulation for the first time. 1
83
Technology has made it possible to transfer payments
electronically. The result is new conveniences such as direct deposit
of wages and Social Security as well as automatic withdrawals using
preauthorized electronic transfer plans and on-line bill paying.
Consumers also have new payment devices, such as cell phones that
can be used for bank transactions. These services reduce the need to
go to a bank branch which can be a great benefit to the poor,
disabled, and consumers who do not have motor vehicles and lack
adequate public transportation.
These new services can pose new problems for consumers,
however. For example, a consumer taking out an on-line payday loan
obtains very fast approval and the loan proceeds are electronically
deposited into the consumer's account very quickly. The consumer,
however, must authorize the lender to withdraw funds from the
consumer's account electronically. Some payday lenders structure the
withdrawals so that unless the consumer affirmatively notifies the
182. Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniformity and the
Risk of Political Defeat, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 247, 268 (2005). It is reasonable to assume
consumers are confused about the differences between stored value cards and other types of cards since
consumers are confused about the differences between credit cards and debit cards. Lloyd Constantine,
Gordon Schnell, Reiko Cyr & Michelle A. Peters, Repairing the Failed Debit Card Market: Lessons
from an Historically Interventionist Federal Reserve and the Recent Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust
Litigation, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 147, 164 (2005); David A. Balto, Can the Promise of Debit Cards Be
Fulfilled?, 53 Bus. LAW. 1093, 1102 (1998). Stored value cards also are susceptible to fraud by cyber
thieves. International Effort Defeats Major Hacking Ring, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 14, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 22895900. (reporting that the FBI arrested members of a sophisticated international
computer hacking organization that compromised data encryption used by a major bank to protect
payroll cards, enabling the criminals to raise the amount of the cards and produce counterfeit cards,
transferring $9 million to persons in six countries around the world in less than 12 hours).
183. The Credit Card Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 401(2), 123 Stat. 1734, 1751 (to be codified
as 15 U.S.C. § 16931-1).
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lender a specified number of days in advance, the lender will
withdraw only interest and the high-cost loan will automatically roll
over to the next payment period, making the loan very expensive.18
4
Payment by cell phone is in its infancy in the United States, but
potential problems can be anticipated. For example, a consumer faces
the risk of severe consequences if an obligation is in default. The
consumer may have used a cell phone to authorize timely payment to
the creditor, but the payment may have failed to reach the creditor.
The consumer can complain to the consumer's financial institution
and under the Electronic Fund Transfers Act (EFTA), the institution
must investigate and correct the error if it is responsible."' If the
institution informs the consumer that its investigation concluded that
it was not at fault, however, the EFTA provides no relief. Assuming
the consumer's financial institution is correct in its findings, the
consumer likely will have no way to determine (short of expensive
discovery in a lawsuit) whether the fault lay in the cell phone's
hardware, the software in the cell phone, the telecommunications
company transmitting the consumer's message, or some other
company involved in the process.
Electronic payments processed through the automated
clearinghouse system are governed by the rules of a private body, the
National Automated Clearinghouse Association (NACHA). Those
rules do not grant consumers the right to sue financial institutions or
businesses that violated the rules. 186 The government has resorted to
184. E.g., PaycheckToday.com, supra note 178. In addition to being subject to the questionable
practices of payday lenders, consumers who take out payday loans also have been targeted by persons
posing as debt collectors and demanding payment of non-existent bills. They appear legitimate to the
consumer because they have a great deal of personal information about the consumer, apparently the
fruits of a data breach affecting thousands of consumers. Daniel Wolfe, Scam Trends, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 9, 2009, at 5, available at 2009 WLNR 17611116.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(b) (2006). Banking by cell phone also exposes the consumer to cyber fraud.
For example, a computer bug targeted consumers using their iPhones to engage in Internet banking.
iPhone Hit with Worm, WORLD ENT. NEWS NETWORK, Nov. 24, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
23647995.
186. See supra note 158. The NACHA Rules do not provide a right of action for bank customers
whose funds are removed from deposit accounts via the ACH system. Financial institutions and others
who are parties to contracts NACHA requires for participation in the ACH system, however, are bound
by their contractual obligation to comply with the NACHA rules. MARK BUDN1TZ, LAUREN IC
SAUNDERS & MARGOT SAUNDERS, CONSUMER BANKING & PAYMENTS LAW 146-47 (4th ed. 2009).
There is little case law and it is divided. Sec. First Network Bank v. C.A.P.S., Inc., No. 01 C 342, 2002
1177
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electronic payments of food stamp benefits.'8 7 In conjunction with
that, states have contracted with private companies to operate the
systems used to transfer funds to needy recipients. This sounds like a
sound program--delegate to high-tech companies the task that they
are especially equipped to do and that state governments are not.
Some of these companies, however, have failed to properly provide
the benefits.' 
88
Consumers purchasing mass market digital products such as
software face formidable challenges. The terms imposed by sellers
and licensees "provide no usable remedies for product quality
defects."' 189 While that also is true when buying other products such
as a used car sold "as is," consumers buying software are trapped by
factors not ordinarily present when buying other types of goods. If
one company obtains dominance when a new product is introduced
into the marketplace, consumers buying that product may have to buy
other products by the same company in order to avoid interoperability
problems when communicating with other persons, and to avoid the
high costs of switching to another system.
190
Technology also was a factor in the current mortgage crisis. The
industry's frantic pursuit of borrowers was fueled by the ability to
securitize individual mortgages into vast pools. 191 Technology made
securitization possible.
1 92
WL 485352, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2002) (holding a bank customer could sue for breach of the
NACHA Rules because its agreement with its bank required it to comply with the NACHA Rules).
Contra Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Sylvan State Bank, 894 F. Supp. 1470, 1478 (D. Kan. 1995).
187. BUDNITZ, SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS, supra note 186, at 217-56.
188. Will Higgins, SIB Privatization Deal at Risk, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 8, 2009, at Al, available
at 2009 WLNR 15648034 (reporting that IBM wrongly denies food stamps to many).
189. Jean Braucher, New Basics: Twelve Principles for Fair Commerce in Mass-Market Software and
Other Digital Products, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE "INFORMATION ECONOMY" 177
(Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
190. Id.
191. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039,2039-40 (2007).
192. Id. at 2045. Securitization is described as "financial technology." Id. See generally Harry Terris,
Gauging Prospects for Securitization Without Subsidy, AM. BANKER, June 19, 2009, at 1, available at
2009 WLNR 11693534 (discussing possible structure of securitization in the future).
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Technology is both good and bad for consumers, depending on
how it is used. 193 Online banking and shopping enable the elderly and
disabled instant access to financial services they might otherwise not
be able to enjoy, especially if they live in rural areas or urban
neighborhoods without adequate public transportation. However, in
order to take advantage of this service, consumers must agree to
contracts containing onerous terms. 194  In addition, conducting
consumer transactions exposes consumers to many threats including
hacking into the consumer's computer to insert viruses, malware, and
spyware. 195 The industry is developing new techniques to protect
consumer privacy and the security of the communications lines over
which personal information flows, but they present their own privacy
issues. 196 Comparison shopping is much easier if the consumer can
go on-line to compare the goods and prices of one store with
193. Professor Jane Winn has noted that "technological change can be a two-edged sword" both
promoting and suppressing competition. JANE K. WINN, Is Consumer Protection an Anachronism in the
Information Economy?, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE "INFORMATION ECONOMY,"
supra note 189, at 1.
194. Mark E. Budnitz, Donald F. Clifford, Michael Ferry & Margot Saunders, Home Banking
Services Agreements: Don't Bank on Them, 61 Bus. LAW. 641 (2006).
195. Future Wars Will Be Fought in Cyberspace, FIN. EXPRESS, Aug. 24, 2009, available at 2009
WLNR 17647354 (reporting that viruses, spyware, and malware are the major threats to consumers
using computers); Gary Dymsk, Taking Steps Against Hackers, NEWSDAY, Aug. 19, 2009, available at
2009 WLNR 16125063 (reporting that many individuals do not obtain adequate protection to guard
against computer viruses, spyware, and malware); Court Orders Internet Pagejackers to Return Ill-
Gotten Gains, U.S. FED'L NEWS, Aug. 2, 2009 (reporting that a court ordered three persons held in
contempt in connection with an FTC case brought against them for illegal spyware installed in
consumers' computers). Some problems consumers confront are due simply to computer glitches, rather
than affirmative action by wrongdoers. Internet Glitch Hits Bank of America, ATLANTA J.-CONST, Dec.
2, 2009 (reporting that because of a computer malfunction, consumers were unable to transfer funds
between accounts online).
196. Daniel Wolfe, Heartland Completes First Test of Encryption System, AM. BANKER, July 1, 2009,
at 13, available at 2009 WLNR 12492218 (reporting that Heartland Payment Systems, whose database
of consumer cardholder information was the victim of a major security breach, had improved its system
to encrypt consumer information); Cardline Global, Voiceprints Used to Authenticate Bill-Pay, AM.
BANKER, June 30, 2009, at 12, available at 2009 WLNR 12419235 (using consumers' voiceprints to
authenticate identity); Sam Woods, Academics to Make Science Fiction Fact, JOURNAL LIVE, May 29,
2008, http://www.joumallive.co.uk/north-east-news/todays-news/2008/05/29/academics-to-make-
science-fiction-fact-61634-20988761/ (reporting on the ongoing development of cards that contain an
individual's voiceprint and other unique identifiers; the government and other organizations would be
barred from obtaining this data to avoid individuals' privacy concerns); Marianne Menna, From
Jamestown to Silicon Valley, Pioneering a Lawless Frontier: The Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 12, pt. III.D n.l 14 (2001) (stating that voiceprints is a
technology that presents a privacy threat as well as the safeguard of verifying one's identity).
1179
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another. 197 Those with low incomes, however, may not be able to
afford the cost of access to the Intemet.
198
Another feature of the Internet is the presence of sites where
consumers describe their experiences with companies and products.
These sites serve two beneficial functions. One, they provide
information for consumers.1 99 Two, they act as "industry watchdogs"
and hopefully motivate companies to improve their goods and
services in order to garner more favorable reviews.20 0  The
information provided by the reviewers, however, may not be
reliable. 20 1 Racial and other forms of discrimination may be less
197. Sean O'Reilly, Nominative Fair Use and Internet Aggregators: Copyright and Trademark
Challenges Posed by Bots, Web Crawlers and Screen-Scraping Technologies, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REv. 273, 276-77 (2007); see Edward Rubin, The Internet, Consumer Protection and Practical
Knowledge, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE "INFORMATION ECONOMY," supra note 189,
at 35, 50 (proposing to take advantage of the Internet's interactivity potential to make TILA disclosures
more useful).
198. Edward Sholinsky, Note, Blocking Access to the Information Superhighway: Regulating the
Internet out of the Reach of Low-Income Americans, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 321 (2006). Studies also suggest
the "digital divide" extends not only to those with low incomes, but also for African Americans and
Latinos. Leonard M. Baynes, Race, Media Consolidation, and Online Content: The Lack of Substitutes
Available to Media Consumers of Color, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 199 (2006); Leonard Baynes, "The
Mercedes Divide? "American Segregation Shapes the Color of Electronic Commerce, 29 W. NEW ENG.
L. REv. 165 (2006).
199. Winn has noted that consumers do not only purchase goods and services on the Internet. They
also consume information, and information is fundamentally different from goods and services.
Information, unlike goods and services, "can be used by an unlimited number of people, an unlimited
number of times." Jane K. Winn, Is Consumer Protection an Anachronism in the Information
Economy?, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE "INFORMATION ECONOMY," supra note 189,
at 1, 3. For a discussion of what type of information consumers need, see Rubin, supra note 197, at 35,
46-47.
200. Jonathan Schwartz, Making the Consumer Watchdog's Bark As Strong As Its Gripe: Complaint
Sites and the Changing Dynamic of the Fair Use Defense, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 59 (2006); Martha
Kelley, Is Liability Just a Link Away?: Trademark Dilution by Tarnishment Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and Hyperlinks on the World Wide Web, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 361
(2002).
201. The information is usually unverifiable and may not be accurate. Unfavorable postings may have
been made by competitors. Favorable postings may have been made by persons associated with the
business that is the subject of the posting. See Claire Cain Miller, Company Settles Case of Reviews It
Faked, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at B5 (describing Lifestyle Lifts's settlement with New York
Attorney General who accused company of having employees pose as satisfied customers and of efforts
to pressure critical consumers and have their posts removed); Brad Reese, Belkin President Apologizes
for Paying Users to Post Positive Reviews of Belkin Products, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 20, 2009,
http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/37495; Belkin Fake Reviews Case Raises Broad
Questions About Peer Ratings, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 20, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1518574
(describing company employee who offered to pay people to post favorable reviews of company's
products and to rate unfavorable reviews as unhelpful).
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prevalent when purchasing on-line because of the relative anonymity
which is involved, unlike a face-to-face transaction. Shopping on the
Internet, however, also enables sellers to collect a vast amount of
information about consumers, resulting in a serious loss of privacy.
20 2
In addition, the anonymity of the Internet works both ways: the
consumer may have difficulty judging the trustworthiness of a
company which interacts with the consumer only through automatic
electronic responses to the consumer's mouse clicks.203  While
technology has brought consumers many benefits, thieves have used
technology to steal vast amounts of personal consumer
information.
2 04
VI. THE KEYS TO SURVIVAL: LAW REFORM AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
This Part considers whether consumer protection law will survive
against the far more powerful industry forces that continue to try to
undermine that law. It explores this issue by examining the more
general phenomenon of consumerism, of which consumer protection
law is one feature. The article considers whether the consumerism of
the past years can be accurately characterized as a social movement.
It concludes that consumerism is a social movement and analyzes the
202. Tal Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity
As Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 991, 1010 (2004) (explaining that sellers collect and analyze personal information about consumer
behavior and can lock them into high prices); Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond Identity on the Internet:
Espionage and Counterespionage in the Internet Age, 28 VT. L. REV. 91, 92 (2003) (proposing that
persons counter discriminatory steering and marketing by adopting false identities); Behavioral
Advertising: Industry Practices and Consumers' Expectations, Testimony Before the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, and the Subcomm.
on Communications, Technology, and the Internet, 11 th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Jeff Chester,
Executive Director, Center for Digital Democracy).
203. Phishing is an egregious example of the dangers of seller anonymity. See David Koenigsberg,
Developments in Banking and Financial Law 2005: Security with Online Banking, 25 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 118, 119 (2006); see supra note 176.
204. Attorney General Long Announces Multi-State Settlement with TJX Companies, over Massive
Data Breach, U.S. FED'L NEWS, June 26, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 12222083; Nadia Oehlsen,
Extent of Heartland Breach Unknown; Probes Multiply, AM. BANKER, Feb. 25, 2009, at 10, available at
2009 WLNR 3592626; Rebecca Sausner, Card Firms Unmoved by Heartland Encryption Push, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 3, 2009, at 7, available at 2009 WLNR 4019653.
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interaction of this movement, consumer organizations, and the
development of consumer law. This Part finds the key to survival
depends on this interaction.
A. Consumerism As a Social Movement
Consumerism has been a phenomenon of American society for
many years. 20 5 There are consumer organizations, consumer laws,
government agencies dedicated to enforce those laws, and many
Americans who become involved in consumer protection activities.
206
This Part considers whether consumerism has developed into
something more substantial. That is, does consumerism contain
elements that suggest it is a social movement? If it is, consumerism
has a far greater chance at survival and effectiveness.
1. Social Movements and Social Change
Professor Coglianese provides a definition of a social movement
and its relationship to law reform.
Social change lies at the heart of the definition of a social
movement. A social movement is a broad set of sustained
organizational efforts to change the structure of society or the
distribution of society's resources. Within social movements, law
reformers typically view law as a resource or strategy to achieve
desired social change. Since social change is the purpose of a
205. Roger Swagler, Consumerism, Modem, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT,
supra note 23, at 172, 172-73. Swagler explains that "consumerism" has been defined in various ways
including: a concern for "consumer protection laws, the availability of product and price information,
fraudulent and deceptive business practices, and product safety." Id. at 172. Another definition defines
the term simply to mean "organized groups seeking to protect consumers." Id. at 173; see Robert 0.
Herrmann, Consumerism: Its Goals, Organization, and Future, in CONSUMERISM: THE ETERNAL
TRIANGLE 21 (Barbara B. Murray ed., 1973); Richard H. Buskirk & James T. Rothe, Consumerism-An
Interpretation, in CONSUMERISM: THE ETERNAL TRIANGLE, supra, at 31.
206. See HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 12-14. One indication that consumers become actively
involved in consumer issues occurred when the FRB received over 60,000 comments on its proposed
credit card rules. Amanda Rugged, Latest Obama Target: Credit Card Companies and Their Lending
Rules, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 27, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 8531891.
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social movement, law reform generally is taken to providing a
means of realizing that goal.20 7
As discussed above, the desire to pursue a consumerist agenda was
the basis of both national and local consumer organizations. 2 0 These
organizations sought to change the way companies did business and
fought for changes in the law as well. Working to satisfy many of the
same goals have been lawyers representing consumers in individual
cases and before legislative and administrative agencies. These
consumer lawyers began this effort on a sustained organizational
level in legal services offices funded by OEO. The legal services
program was part of OEO's Anti-Poverty effort. Social change was a
fundamental objective of OEO, and law reform was the priority of the
legal services program. 20 9 The government funded the National
Consumer Law Center in order to assist local legal services programs
meet that priority. Thus, the consumer activities that emerged in the
1960s and continue today fit within Professor Coglianese's definition
of a social movement: there was a sustained organizational effort to
effect social change, consumer lawyers were a resource, and law
reform was one of the strategies used.
Perhaps coincidently, at the same time consumer lawyers began
their efforts, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act to make the
credit markets work more efficiently by providing consumers with
information they could use to comparison shop. As discussed above,
Congress continued to play a crucial role in enabling the consumer
movement to achieve many of its objectives by enacting many more
statutes, and administrative agencies also promoted consumerism by
issuing regulations that were necessary to effectuate the goals of the
207. Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the
Environmental Movement, 150 U. PENN. L. REv. 85, 85 (2001). See generally Meili, supra note 168, at
121-22 (describing three theories of social movements). "[Olne of the most important lessons of the
civil rights movement: a successful litigation strategy must be linked to a social movement." Davis,
supra note 27, at 39.
208. HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1; Meili, supra note 168, at 123.
209. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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legislation.210 In that way, the government itself fostered the social
change objective of consumer organizations and consumer lawyers.
2. Organizational Efforts
According to Professor Coglianese, "[a] social movement is a
broad set of sustained organizational efforts."211 The consumer
movement has had the good fortune of the long-time work of many
organizations. Legal organizations such as NCLC and the National
Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) have played a crucial
role in developing and sustaining the law component of the consumer
movement, as have primarily non-legal organizations such as the
Center for Responsible Lending, US PIRG, the National Consumers
League, AARP, Consumer Action, Consumers Union, Public Citizen,
the Center for Auto Safety, and Consumer Federation of America.
Without the continuing labors of these groups, the movement
would cease. For even after consumer aspirations become law as a
result of a statutory enactment or case law development, as discussed
in Part II, consumer protection law reforms are ethereal. Protections
may evaporate when political winds shift, resulting in more business
oriented legislators and judges.2 12 But maintaining and ensuring the
survival of these institutions is problematic. Institutions need stable
and adequate funding. Non-profit public interest groups have a
precarious existence. They depend primarily on funding from
foundations, government grants, and individual donations, none of
210. See supra text accompanying notes 43-54, 103-09. Sometimes administrative agencies have
issued regulations that have been viewed as contrary to consumers' interests. See supra text
accompanying note 132. Rubin notes that often law "is autonomously generated by the political
sphere-the legislature, the courts, and increasingly, the administrative agencies," rather than by social
movements. Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal
Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11 (2001).
211. Coglianese, supra note 207, at 85. Rubin, however, distinguishes between organizations and
social movements. "The prevailing view is that organizations ... are not the same as social movements.
Rather, social movements are regarded as consisting of more diffuse agglomerations of individuals
within society who are linked together by ideology, beliefs, or collective identities. Organizations may
catalyze the creation of these agglomerations, or may be generated by them .... The movement itself
exists in the social sphere, however, while the organizations that created it or were created by it bridge
the social and political spheres .... Rubin, supra note 210, at 4-5 (emphasis added).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
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which can be depended upon for permanent support.2 13 Foundation
support depends on whether the mission of individual foundations
include promoting consumer protection. And the extent to which
even a foundation dedicated to consumer protection can provide
support is dependent on economic conditions.
The reliability of individual contributions will always be uncertain.
The Internet, however, has opened up new opportunities, providing
consumer organizations with a powerful and relatively inexpensive
tool for raising funds from individuals, while providing value to them
in the form of an easy-to-use platform for becoming actively involved
in promoting consumer protection and supplying useful information.
For example, the web sites of consumer groups include petitions and
sample letters to legislators on specific issues and legislative
proposals. In addition, they provide a great deal of information to
keep consumers informed and educate consumers so they can better
protect themselves. The availability of such free information on the
Internet, however, also presents the opportunity for "free riders."
214
That is, many consumers may decide not to donate to support a
consumer organization because they can obtain what they want from
the group's website without paying anything.
The precarious existence of consumer organizations is illustrated
by events in the late 1970s and 1980s. The major organizations
pursuing consumer protection law reform from its earliest years had
been offices funded by the Legal Services Program. With the drastic
budget cutbacks in legal services funding during the Reagan years,
legal services offices had to limit their representation to those cases
presenting the greatest threat to the well-being of their clients. As a
result, the top priorities were cases involving housing, domestic
violence, and essential government benefits.215 Less attention was
given to consumer cases. Although these steps were necessary, more
limited involvement in consumer cases was unfortunate because of
213. See generally HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1; HANDLER, supra note 75, at 9, 12-13.
214. HANDLER, supra note 75, at 5-6.
215. Meiii, supra note 168, at 125.
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the direct relationship between consumer problems and the cycle of
poverty in which many low income persons are caught.
2 16
In addition to the cutbacks in legal services, the budgets of
enforcement agencies were reduced and accomplishments were
negated when the federal government deregulated many industries.
2 17
Nevertheless, the legal component of the consumer movement
survived the period because consumer organizations were able to
continue their work. One example is NCLC. Despite losing legal
services funding, NCLC played a pivotal role in ensuring both the
continuation of skilled consumer representation and law reform
advocacy during this period. It continued the lawyer training in which
it had been engaged from its early days. This consisted of organizing
training conferences 218 and producing manuals. 219 The conferences
provided basic education to lawyers new to consumer law and
advanced sessions for seasoned veterans. Through these activities,
NCLC produced a growing body of lawyers, both in legal services
offices and private practice, who had the knowledge needed to
represent consumers in a wide variety of matters where they faced
lawyers for industry with far greater resources.220 Another benefit of
the conferences was the opportunity to network with other lawyers
handling similar cases.
NCLC continues this crucial organizational role today. In addition
to its manuals and conferences, it has taken advantage of technology,
216. For example, for a consumer living in a place with inadequate or non-existent public
transportation, a motor vehicle is a necessity. Most low income consumers buy used cars on credit. Used
car dealers are notorious for their unfair and deceptive practices and often sell lemons "as is" for inflated
prices which soon become inoperable without expensive repairs. The consumer now finds herself
without a car, making it very difficult or impossible to get to work, get to medical facilities, get her
children to child care while she works, and do other essential tasks. Meanwhile, the creditor will
continue to demand car payments even though the car is no longer operable. Even assuming the
consumer can still get to her job, she cannot afford to buy another car since she still owes money on the
lemon. If she loses her job because she no longer has reliable transportation, she will likely need
government benefits in order to survive. This person's consumer problem consequently is the direct
cause of her downward spiral into poverty.
217. RENUART & KEEST-CREDIT, supra note 62, at 42-50.
218. Willard P. Ogbum, National Consumer Law Center, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONSUMER
MOVEMENT, supra note 23, at 391, 394.
219. HOBBS & GARDNER, supra note 1, at 20; Ogburn, supra note 218, at 393.
220. Meili, supra note 168, at 127 (reporting that the "number of private attorneys practicing
consumer law has increased tenfold in the past decade").
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establishing e-mail listservs that act as a "virtual law firm" in which
consumer lawyers "share substantive legal expertise, information
about defendants, and strategy., 221 Its web site provides instant
access to many resources.
222
NCLC also was instrumental in establishing a new organization,
the National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA).223 NACA
has over 1,500 members including attorneys and consumer
advocates. 224 The attorney membership consists of private lawyers as
well as legal services attorneys, law professors and law students.
225
NACA serves as "a forum for communication, networking, and
information sharing" among its members.226 Consumers can go to its
website and locate an attorney who may be willing to take the
consumer's case. NACA has filed numerous amicus briefs and
testified in regard to proposed legislation and regulations.227 NACA
conducts training conferences on current issues.
228
While NCLC and NACA are primarily legal organizations, their
efforts are supported and augmented by other consumer advocacy
organizations that help ensure the continued vitality of the consumer
movement such as Consumers Union,229 Consumer Federation of
America, 230 the National Consumers League, 231 US PIRG,2 32 Public
221. Id.
222. See NCLC, http://www.consumerlaw.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
223. Meili, supra note 168, at 126.
224. NACA, http://www.naca.net (last visited Mar. 9,2010).
225. Meili characterizes private attorneys litigating consumer cases as .'free agent litigators' who
are loyal to the consumer movement but have no formal relationship to movement leaders and are
accountable to their clients, not the movement. Meili, supra note 168, at 127.
226. NACA Mission, http://www.naca.net/about-consumer-advocates/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
227. E.g., Sival v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 912 N.E.2d 945 (Mass. 2009). NACA's website,
http://www.naca.net (last visited Mar. 9, 2010), describes NACA's testimony on issues such as
predatory lending, credit reports, and lending abuses targeting the military.
228. E.g., NACA's 2010 Auto Fraud Conference, http://www.naca.net/News-
Events/Event.aspx?item=69755 (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
229. Consumers Union, http://www.consumersunion.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). In order to reach
younger consumers by communicating with them through the medium they use, Consumers Union
purchased the Consumerist blog. Advocates Must Adapt to Media Changes, CFA NEWS, Mar.-May
2009, at 2.
230. Consumer Federation of America, http://www.consumerfed.org (last visited Mar. 9,2010).
231. Nat'l Consumer League, http://www.nclnet.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
232. U.S. PRIG, Standing Up to Powerful Interests, http://www.uspirg.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
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Justice, the Center for Responsible Lending,234  and AARP. 2 35
These organizations often file joint amicus briefs and testimony. Each
organization arguably increases its individual credibility and is able
to participate in more law reform efforts by cooperating with and
working in conjunction with other organizations.
Lawyers have been crucial players in the consumer movement. In
order for this to continue, however, there must be an organizational
structure for ensuring an adequate supply of new lawyers to replace
those who retire or for other reasons drop out. In the infancy of
consumer law, the legal services program was that organization.
Consumer lawyers came overwhelmingly from legal services
offices.236 Law schools did not play a significant role; most offered
no courses in consumer protection. The picture today is very
different. Many law schools offer traditional as well as clinical
courses in consumer law. 237 Many professors have taught consumer
law for a considerable length of time.238 Law professors also have
produced a substantial body of consumer law scholarship. In this
way, legal education provides another organizational support for the
development of future consumer lawyers and consumer law.
The movement needs the active presence of consumer
organizations and cannot depend on government agencies. The
robustness of enforcement efforts by government agencies such as
233. Public Justice, America's Public Interest Law Firm, http://www.publicjustice.net/ (last visited
Mar. 9,2010).
234. Center for Responsible Lending, www.responsiblelending.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
235. Ass'n for the Advancement of Retired Persons, http://www.aarp.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40, 79.
237. Professors who teach consumer law courses include: Stephen Calkins,
http://www.law.wayne.edu (last visited Mar. 9, 2010); Alvin Harrell, http://www.okcu.edu (last visited
Mar. 9, 2010); Michael Greenfield, http://www.wustl.edu (last visited Mar. 9, 2010); Christopher
Peterson, http://www.law.utah.edu (last visited Mar. 9, 2010); Jeff Sovem, http://www.stjohns.edu (last
visited Mar. 9, 2010); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, http://www.law.drake.edu (last visited Mar. 9, 2010);
and Patricia McCoy, http://www.law.uconn.edu (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). Professors teaching clinical
consumer courses include: Stephen Meili, http://www.law.umn.edu (last visited Mar. 9, 2010); Kurt
Eggert, http://www.chapman.edulaw/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2010); and Richard McElvaney,
http://www.law.uh.edu (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). Rubin notes that social movements result in
legislation and that leads new courses in law schools. Rubin, supra note 210, at 11.
238. According to the 2007-2008 AALS Directory of Law Teachers, 50 full-time law professors have
been teaching a consumer law course for over ten years. THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
2007-2008, at 1255-56 (2007-2008).
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the FTC, bank agencies and state attorneys general depends upon the
political climate in which those agencies operate, the resources they
receive, and other priorities needing a share of those resources. In
addition, there is always the risk an agency will become the captive
of the industry it is established to regulate.239 Moreover, companies
base their conduct largely on what business practices will make the
most profit. They "are difficult to regulate in part because they lack
the moral sentiments that promote individual-level obedience to law,"
and "[l]egal sanctions. . . are usually too small and too slow to affect
rational organizational planning." 240 Even if an agency issues strong
regulations, they may be difficult to enforce if they are technically
complex and require the agency to monitor compliance over long
period of time.2
41
As described in Part V, the credit industry will continually develop
new products and marketing practices that are detrimental to
consumers. 242 Well-financed industry trade groups will try to ensure
that regulation is kept to a minimum. This is a significant threat to
strong consumer protection because statutes generally provide
agencies with abundant discretion in drafting regulations. 243 In
addition, a company's response to regulation of its current practices
may not be compliance, but rather evasion, such as inserting into
contracts consumer waivers, seller disclaimers of liability, and
limitations on consumer remedies.2 44 To ensure that regulatory
agencies draft and enforce effective regulations, consumer
organizations need to do what industry representatives likely do: gain
the support of persons in the agencies, including field level staff.24
5
239. Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN.
REV. Soc. 479,487 (1997); HANDLER, supra note 75, at 16.
240. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 239, at 487.
241. HANDLER, supra note 75, at 19.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 156-157, 184, 194.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 156-157, 184, 194.
244. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 239, at 488.
245. HANDLER, supra note 75, at 20-21.
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3. Law Reform Provides Means to Realize Social Change
In describing social movements, Professor Coglianese states that
"[s]ocial change lies at the heart of the definition of a social
movement" and a social movement is "a broad set of sustained
organizational efforts to change the structure of society or the
distribution of society's resources. 246 Moreover, law reform is a
means of achieving social change. 24 7 Beginning in the 1960s, several
legal organizations including the National Consumer Law Center, the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, legal services programs, and later on
lawyers on the staffs of Consumers Union, NACA, US PIRG, and
AARP have engaged in law reform in order to improve consumers'
position in the marketplace. Contrary to Professor Coglianese's first
formulation, however, they have not sought to do this by changing
the structure of society. Instead, they have worked within that
structure to improve the legal rights of consumers. Furthermore, they
have not tried to change the fundamental structure of the legal
system, but rather have sought far more limited goals.
248
Consequently, the role played by consumer law organizations does
not fit neatly within this component of Professor Coglianese's model
of what constitutes a social movement, for the law reform component
has not sought to change the structure of society.
Although consumer law organizations have not tried to change the
structure of society or even of the legal system, they have made a
significant impact on society that arguably qualifies as social change
because they have changed some basic features of the law governing
the marketplace. While they worked within the legal system and
often with government agencies, 249 the legislation they supported
resulted in statutes that embody significant national public policy that
never existed before. Examples include a consumer's legal right not
to be subjected to discrimination in the extension of credit, insurance,
246. Coglianese, supra note 207, at 85 (emphasis added).
247. Id.
248. An early example is litigation such as Sniadach, which curbed the creditor's ability to use the
state's powers against consumers without restraint. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
249. Consumers Union was the consumer representative in FTC Rulemaking proceedings under that
agency's intervenor funding program. HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 106, at 174.
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or employment based on the consumer's gender, race, national origin,
or religion;250 and a limited right to privacy in regards to credit
reports251 and information sharing by financial institutions. 252 Major
requirements have been placed on financial institutions such as the
requirement to investigate consumers' credit card billing disputes
253
and disputes over the electronic transfer of funds.254 In these and
other ways, companies can no longer conduct business the way they
used to.
4. Effort to Change Society's Distribution of Resources
Even if one assumes consumer law organizations do not come
within Professor Coglianese's first formulation of a social movement
because their law reform efforts, however substantial, are not an
attempt change the structure of society, their efforts do satisfy
Professor Coglianese's alternative formulation because their
objective is to change the distribution of society's resources. For
example, many of the cases they have brought and bills they have
supported in Congress and state legislatures have as their objective a
change in legal rules that would result in less money going to
businesses and more staying in consumers' pockets. An example is
the effort to control interest rates and other credit charges imposed by
creditors.255
5. From Social Movement to Institutionalization
As described above, "consumerism" has developed into a social
movement. Its chances of survival, however, were greatly enhanced
250. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 elseq. (2006).
251. Id. §§ 1681 etseq.
252. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Fin. Servs. Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338.
253. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(0 (2009).
254. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693 et seq. (2006).
255. For example, the National Consumer Law Center's National Consumer Act (undated) and its
Model Consumer Credit Act 1973. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. "[L]arge forward
movements are possible only as the expectations of people increase as a result of numerous small
struggles, reforms, and increased understanding." DAVIS, supra note 27, at 142 (quoting Edward V.
Sparer).
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by the movement's institutionalization. Professor Coglianese has
examined one social movement in particular: the environmental
movement. He has identified several developments that demonstrate
the environmental movement has become institutionalized. One
development was the passage of several major statutes.256 Enactment
of those laws was accompanied by government agencies issuing
regulations and enforcing the law.257 Private organizations grew
"more professional, increasing both the size and specialization of
their staffs., 258 They published extensively.259 "Environmentalism
had matured from a social movement to an extensive network of
interest group organizations with a presence in Washington, D.C like
that of any other political lobby."
260
The consumer movement has experienced comparable
developments, indicating that it too has been institutionalized.
Congress has passed several major statutes261 that government
agencies have enforced and pursuant to which they have issued
262
regulations. Movement objectives typically are carried out in
Washington by national organizations rather than by local grass roots
community groups such as CEPA.263 The organizations' activity
often consists of formal testimony presented by professionals such as
256. Coglianese, supra note 207, at 117.
257. Id. at 115.
258. Id. at 101.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 102.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 43, 250-54.
262. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2009) (Reg. Z); 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2009) (Reg. E); 12 C.F.R. § 202 (2009)
(Reg. B).
263. See supra text accompanying note 23. Some national organizations focus their activities on the
local level. See, e.g., Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America (NACA), http://www.naca.com
(last visited Mar. 9, 2010). Independent grass roots protests have continued as well. Anti-Bank
Protestors Picket Goldman, Wells, AM. BANKER, Oct. 27, 2009 (reporting that members of the National
People's Action, a community group, and the Service Employees International Union organized a
protest on Chicago streets to demonstrate their anger at home foreclosures, predatory lending practices,
and excessive bonuses paid to bank executives); Mathew Monks, Stunts May Be Silly, But They're
Serious for Banks, AM. BANKER, July 2, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 12561425 (describing
protest at local branch bank by Empowering and Strengthening Ohio's People); Emily Udell, Hundreds
Back Crackdown on Payday Loan Companies, COURIER-J., Mar. 24, 2009, at 3B. Institutionalization
does not necessarily mean the end of grassroots activity, but institutionalization can greatly affect it.
Grassroots mobilization, when employed, became integrated into the environmentalists' legislative
agenda and was strategically targeted at specific members of Congress. Coglianese, supra note 207, at
100.
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lawyers before Congressional committees and administrative
agencies. 264  While some organizations cover a wide variety of
265
consumer issues, others are specialized. They publish manuals for
lawyers,266 books for consumer advocates, 267 and educational guides
for the public.268 They also conduct studies.269
It is significant that this institutionalization of the consumer
movement affects not only consumer organizations, but also
government entities. For example, the consumer movement had a
major impact on the FTC and FRB, whose original missions did not
include consumer protection. Indeed, the FRB initially resisted taking
on that responsibility.270  Once consumerism had become
264. E.g., Mandatory Binding Arbitration, Testimony of Stuart T Rossman, Director, Nat 7 Consumer
Law Ctr., Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11 th
Cong. (2009), available at 2009 WLNR 18244651 [hereinafter Rossman Testimony]; Comments of the
National Consumer Law Center, National Association of Consumer Advocates, Consumer Federation of
America, Consumers Union, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group, In the Matter of Telemarketing
Rulemaking, FTC File No. R41 1001 (Apr. 10, 2002), submitted by Olivia Wein, Carolyn Carter and
Margot Saunders, all identified in the Comment as attorneys at NCLC.
265. Compare the topics the Consumer Federation of America lists on its web site,
http://www.consumerfed.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) (listing communications, energy, finance, food
and agriculture, health and safety, and housing), and the topics listed on the website of Americans for
Financial Reform, http://www.ourfmancialsecurity.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2010) (listing the consumer
financial protection agency, hedge funds, credit rating agencies, the financial transaction tax, systemic
risk, and foreclosure prevention), with the Center for Auto Safety, http://www.autosafety.org (last
visited Mar. 9, 2010) (listing airbags, oil sludge, and vehicle recalls).
266. NCLC has published an eighteen-volume series of manuals for lawyers. NCLC, Publications for
Lawyers, https://shop.consumerlaw.org/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
267. NCLC's books for advocates include: Surviving Debt, Guide to the Rights of Utility Consumers,
Stop Predatory Lending, and Guide to the Rights of Domestic Violence Survivors. Id.
268. E.g., National Consumers League, http://www.nclnet.org/personal-finance (last visited Mar. 9,
2010); Consumer Action, http://www.consumer-action.org/publications (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
269. E.g., ELISA ODABASHIAN, CONSUMERS UNION, GETTING MILKED, BAY AREA SUPERMARKETS
CHARGE Too MUCH FOR MILK (2004), http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/nilkrpt04.pdf; U.S. PIRG,
BAILOUT REPORT CARD: WHAT DID OBAMA'S TEAM LEARN? (2009), available at
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.orglassets/s9ybLaplPTISBQRaixRqgw/USPIRG-BailoutReportCard6
22_09.pdf; DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE
WHEN THEY SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR, SERVICERS
COMPENSATION & ITS CONSEQUENCES (2009), available at
http://www.consumerlaw.org/issuesmortgage-servicing/content/Servicer-ReportiO09.pdf; Jean Ann
Fox & Patrick Woodnall, Consumers Pay Steep Premium to 'Bank' at Check Cashing Outlets,
CONSUMER FED'N AM., Nov. 2006.
270. Supra note 86. HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 106, at 147 (stating that those who created the FTC
did not consider consumer protection to be the FTC's responsibility). But as a result of the consumer
movement, the FTC became far more aggressive. "The transformation of the FTC was one element of
the far-reaching institutional development that took place during the late 1960s and 1970s in the area of
consumer protection." Id. at 179.
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institutionalized, government agencies became part of the network of
organizations, some public, others private, with a stake in the success
of the movement. 27 1 The connection between the private and public
sectors became most apparent when the FTC introduced a program of
"intervenor funding" which was authorized by the Magnuson-Moss
Act. Under this program, the FTC funded consumer groups such as
Consumers Union 273 in order to ensure that the public's views would
be represented in agency proceedings. The industry opposed the
program, "recognizing that imposing such procedural changes
represented a fundamental, though incipient, challenge to business'
influence on rulemaking proceedings. 274
After Reagan became president, the FTC eliminated the intervenor
funding program275 along with a general restriction on its consumer
protection activities.276 This development illustrates that because of
the industry's greater resources and the recurrent emergence of
presidents and a Congress hostile to the objectives of the consumer
movement, it is not sufficient that a movement becomes
institutionalized and that institutionalization includes new law that
embodies the movement's goals.277 In addition, its goals must
271. "[C]ause lawyers ... are 'most successful when a confident government is engaged in social
change .... ' Meili, supra note 168, at 135 (citing Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLmCAL COMMITMENTS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 69 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998)). According to one theorist, "social movements succeed when the government
provides tangible benefits to their members that meet the movement's demands, or when it formally
accepts the movement as a valid representative of its members' interests." Rubin, supra note 197, at 82.
Consumer advocates also have been appointed to major roles in government. For example, during the
Carter administration, Ralph Nader's chief lobbyist, Joan Claybrook was the head of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Carol Tucker Forman, who had been Executive Director of
the CFA, was an assistant secretary of agriculture for consumer services. HANDLER, supra note 75, at
76-77. Rahm Emanuel, President Obama's Chief of Staff, was a spokesman for Illinois Public Action
Council, a "Naderite group." Ryan Lizza, The Gatekeeper, Rahm Emanuel on the Job, NEW YORKER,
Mar. 2,2009, at 24, 27.
272. HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 106, at 173; Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-12).
273. HARRIS & MILKIS, supra note 106, at 174.
274. Id. at 176.
275. Id. at 192.
276. Id. at 186-90.
277. See generally Rubin, supra note 197, at 83 (stating that recognition of rights "may be won by the
activism of social movements, but this victory must be secured by the development of legal concepts
... )
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become embedded in society's values.278 Otherwise, the movement
could be killed or severely debilitated.
There are indications that the consumer movement's goals have
been embedded in society's values. Davis and Trebilock note that
many scholars are skeptical about "whether legal institutions play an
independent role in promoting social change." 279 They acknowledge:
"It may be the case that legal systems change only in response to
fundamental historical, economic, cultural or political factors and are
largely immune to top-down attempts at reform." 280 If that is true,
then TILA and accompanying federal law was not a top-down effort
by Congress to change the legal environment for consumers, but a
response to fundamental changes in society's values. Even if a
particular Congress tried to impose its will by enacting statutes such
as TILA, if those laws were contrary to society's values, given
industry's opposition, those laws would not have endured. It is
significant that pressure from the credit industry resulted in
Congress's cutting back on TILA, but not coming even close to
repealing it or any of the other statutes. 28 1 To the contrary, Congress
has continued to enact more laws and strengthen ones already in
effect. 282 That development indicates the movement's goals reflect
society's values. And those consumer protection laws "incorporate
new norms into the ongoing structure of the legal system. 283
The consumer movement has significantly matured. For example,
industry representatives frequently claim the abuses alleged by
consumer advocates are merely anecdotal and do not reflect market
278. Coglianese, supra note 207, at 109, opines: "Legal reform, if it is to have an enduring impact,
needs to be accompanied by a genuine change in public values."
279. Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and Development:
Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM J. COMP. L. 895, 920 (2008).
280. Id.
281. See RENUART & KEEST-TILA, supra note 43, at 5-7 (discussing the Truth in Lending
Simplification Act).
282. E.g., Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160.
NCLC supported passage of this law. Daniel lImmergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy,
Market Development, and the Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 470 (2009); see Fair and
Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952; Credit Repair
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1679 (1996).
283. Rubin, supra note 197, at 83 (commenting on public officials' formal acceptance of the legal
concept of human rights).
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failure requiring regulation.2 84 To counter these assertions, consumer
organizations have conducted many sophisticated and comprehensive
studies documenting widespread abuses. 285 Consumer organizations
have the technical expertise needed by agencies considering new or
revised regulations.
286
Government agencies formerly listened to the views of all sides
and used their best judgment when issuing regulations. Agencies now
supplement this approach with more sophisticated techniques. For
example, to gauge the effectiveness of current and proposed
disclosures, the FRB hired a research and consulting firm that tested
consumers using focus groups to determine what disclosures
consumers would pay attention to, understand, and use.
287
A proposed FTC study also illustrates a more sophisticated
orientation. The FTC intends to conduct studies on consumer
susceptibility to fraudulent and deceptive marketing. 288 The FTC
admits that "surprisingly little is known about what determines
consumers' susceptibility to fraud., 289 The FTC acknowledges the
contributions of social science experiments that have identified
284. Testimony of Richard Hunt on Behalf of Consumer Bankers Ass 'n: Hearing on H.R. 3904, the
Overdraft Protection Act, Before the H. Fin. Services Comm., 111 th Cong. (2009) (urging Congress not
to regulate overdraft fees based on anecdotes of consumers who had to pay a $35 overdraft fee for a $4
cup of coffee). See generally Paul Krugman, How Did Old Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2009 (Magazine) (describing traditional economists' view that markets operate efficiently and
do not need to be regulated).
285. E.g., RICH JURGENS & CHI CHI Wu, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FEE-HARVESTERS: Low-
CREDIT, HIGH-COST CARDS BLEED CONSUMERS (2007); JEAN ANN Fox & ANNA PETRINI, CONSUMER
FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INTERNET PAYDAY LENDING: How HIGH-PRICES LENDERS USE THE
INTERNET TO MIRE BORROWERS IN DEBT AND EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS (2004). For
their part, the industry commissions its own studies, e.g., JONATHAN M. ORSZAG & SUSAN H.
MANNING, AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF REGULATING CREDIT CARD FEES AND INTEREST RATES
(2007) (commissioned by the American Bankers Association; see Adam J. Levitin, A Critique of the
American Bankers Association's Study of Credit Card Regulation, GEO. U.L. CENTER, Mar. 9, 2008,
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 003&context=-adam-levitin).
286. A Note from the Executive Director, OUTLOOK, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CENTER, Fall 2008/Winter
2009, at 2 (stating that NCLC and other consumer groups analyze for agencies the "fine points" that
seem insignificant but can have "an unintended or harmful effect"); Tell It to the Fed! OUTLOOK, NAT'L
CONSUMER L. CENTER, Fall 2008/Winter 2009, at 3 (describing NCLC's "detailed legal analyses"
submitted to agencies).
287. Truth in Lending, Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 5244, 5245-46 (Jan. 29, 2009). The results of the
tests were made available on the FRB's Web site. Id. at 5247.
288. Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request, 74 Fed. Reg.
27,794, 27,796 (June 11, 2009).
289. 74 Fed. Reg. 27,794, 27,795 (June 11,2009).
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"several decision-making biases, such as impulsivity, over-
confidence, over-optimism, and loss aversion, that can cause
inaccurate assessments of the risks, costs and benefits of various
choices. ' ' 290 One of the FTC's studies will consist of a laboratory
experiment to examine whether these biases are related to
susceptibility to deceptive ads.291 The FTC hopes the study will help
it target enforcement actions, design future surveys, and develop
consumer education programs. The second study will consist of a
survey of 5,000 consumers conducted on the Internet, seeking
information on susceptibility to fraud.292
The FTC's planned study illustrates the influence of new
developments in economic theory. Classical economic theory has
provided powerful academic support for industry anti-regulation and
deregulation proposals. The theory is based on the assumption that
consumer behavior is rational and the free market, that is, a market
free of regulation, is the most efficient and therefore best for both
businesses and consumer.293 In the past several years, however, the
field of behavioral economics has gained increasing respectability,
supports the need for more regulation, and provides insights for
drafting more effective regulation.
294
290. Id
291. Id.
292. 74 Fed. Reg. 27,796, 27,797 (June 11, 2009).
293. Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 22 LAW & INEQ. 135, 138 (2009). See generally
Krugman, supra note 284; Martin Crutsinger, Greenspan in "Disbelief," ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 24,
2008 (reporting that Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, acknowledged that the
economic crisis made him realize he was wrong in believing banks would protect their shareholders and
institutions' equity without the need for regulation).
294. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and
Policy, 108 COL. L. REV. 2098 (2008) (reviewing two books that explore consumer irrationality and its
implications for legislators); Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92
MINN. L. REV. 749, 750 (2008) ("[C]onsumer mistakes and sellers' strategic response to these mistakes
are responsible for a substantial welfare loss. ... ); Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer
Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 45 (2006) ("Many consumers systematically underestimate the
total price they will end up paying simply because they do not understand how fast interest accrues.");
Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better Than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment Cards and Consumer
Protection Policy, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 426, 455-56 (2006) (recommending TILA-type
"layered" disclosures for debit cards based on studies of consumer behavior); Jeff Sovern, Toward a
New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1635, 1656-57, 1676-79 (2006) (describing how businesses benefit by obscuring contract terms
and taking advantage of behavior that prevents consumers from making rational choices, and
recommends legislative improvements); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure:
1197
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VII. MISSION ACCOMPLISHED? PROSPECTS AND PERILS
We have seen that consumerism has become an institutionalized
social movement and its values are embedded in society.
Furthermore, the legal component of the movement has persisted and
grown. But can we proclaim "Mission Accomplished?" Of course,
the mission will never be fully accomplished because there will
always be challenges by the business community. Some in that
community will continue to devise new scams, new products, new
ways to avoid litigation brought by consumers, and new strategies to
defeat proposed statutes and regulations. Nevertheless, consumer
advocates can claim "mission accomplished" in the sense that
consumer protection is an embedded cultural value and consumer
protection law is here to stay.
One lens through which to view where the consumer movement
stands today is to examine two significant recent developments: the
Credit Card Act of 2009 and the proposed Consumer Financial
Protection Agency. While representing major steps forward, they also
illustrate the perils that lie ahead.
The Credit Card Act of 2009,295 containing extensive amendments
to TILA, provides a useful illustration of the status of new consumer
legislation forty years after TILA became effective. The need for the
amendments arose because of the industry's skill in developing new
ways to impose costs upon consumers. 296 It is significant that
Congress was willing to confront the challenges posed by changes in
the industry's practices, especially since the FRB had recently issued
297
regulations that covered some of the same ground. But passage
came only with clear Democratic majorities in Congress and a
The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 754-59 (2006) (describing consumer
behavior and proposing simplified and standardized disclosures for home loans). But see Ronald J.
Mann, Unsafe at Any Price? 157 U. PA. L. REv. 167 (2009) (stating that behavioral economics is based
on little empirical research).
295. Credit Card Act, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).
296. Alces, supra note 154, at 1512.
297. TILA, Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 5244 (Jan. 29, 2009); Unfair Deceptive Acts or Practices, Final
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 5498 (Jan. 29, 2009); see also Unfair Deceptive Acts or Practices, Clarifications,
Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 20,804 (May 5, 2009) (clarifying confusion caused by the above rules).
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president who was not hostile to consumer protection. 298 Consumer
organizations had been criticizing these practices for several years
and had published studies documenting their use and adverse
effects.299 Scholars also became involved, publishing law review
articles. 30 0 To some extent, the Act continues the much criticized
approach of previous versions of TILA,3 ° 1 merely requiring
disclosure. 30 2 But at least some of the disclosures are of a different
nature than those in former versions of TILA because they provide
consumers with information far more useful to consumers than the
required disclosures in previous versions of TILA.3 °3
Moreover, the Act represents a major step forward because it goes
well beyond disclosure by also granting consumers many substantive
rights.304 For example, the Act includes prohibitions on increasing the
finance charge on any outstanding balance 305 and double cycle
billing.30 6 There are rules for increasing and reducing the annual
percentage rate, 30 7 subprime fee harvester cards,30 8 marketing cards to
consumers younger than twenty-one,30 9 and how much time
298. See President's initiative to establish a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, infra notes 328-
49.
299. JuRGENS & WU, supra note 285.
300. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 154.
301. Laurie A. Burlingame, Getting to the Truth of the Matter: Revising the TILA Credit Card
Disclosure Scheme to Better Protect Consumers, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 308, 326 (2007) (noting
that some consumers find TILA credit card disclosures "confusing and misleading"); Summer Krause,
The Truth in Lending Act: A Case For Expanding Assignee Liability, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1153,
1164 (2009) (characterizing TILA prior to the Truth in Lending Simplification Act as complicated and
difficult to understand); Renuart & Thompson, supra note 52, at 210 (describing the difficulty of
determining the impact of fees on the annual percentage rate under the TILA disclosure scheme).
302. See, for example, § 101 of the Credit Card Act (advance notice of rate increase), and § 201 (pay-
off timing disclosures). Pub. L. No. 111-24, §§ 101,201, 123 Stat. 1734, 1735, 1743 (2009).
303. See, for example, the payoff timing disclosures informing the consumer of how many months it
will take the consumer to pay the entire balance if paying only the required minimum. Credit Card Act
§ 201(a). This type of disclosure is an example of those recommended by Rubin. Rubin, supra note 197,
at 49-50.
304. Some believe disclosure is preferable to substantive provisions that will allegedly limit the
availability of consumer credit. Jeffrey Taf, Viewpoint: Disclosure Better Than Limiting Credit, Am.
BANKER, May 9, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 8665939.
305. Credit Card Act § 171.
306. Id. § 102.
307. Id. §§ 148, 172.
308. Id. § 105.
309. Id. § 301.
1199
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consumers have to make payments. 310 The Act also increases
statutory damages in open end transactions.
311
In some important areas, the Act delegates to administrative
agencies the task of issuing regulations. For example, the Act does
not regulate the amount of fees creditors may charge. This is arguably
a major deficiency in the Act and in marked contrast to the Military
Lending Act.3 12 Instead, the Act requires that penalty fees or charges
"be reasonable and proportional to [the consumer's] omission or
violation." 313 The FRB is required to issue rules "to establish
standards for assessing" whether a fee or charge is reasonable and
proportional.3 14 Those rules are crucial for consumers. Depending on
how the rules are drafted, they could protect consumers just as well
as rate regulation, or they could be so general that they provide no
meaningful protection. Under the Act, the FRB must consult with,
inter alia, the OCC when drafting the rules. In the past, the OCC has
issued rules that basically permit national banks to charge whatever
fees they want.315 If the OCC maintains this approach and the FRB
agrees, this provision will provide no benefit to consumers.
Another example of the Act's delegation of a major area to
regulation by the FRB is in regard to gift cards. The Act amends the
EFTA by restricting dormancy fees and expiration dates. 316 However,
the Act delegates to the FRB the task of issuing rules relating to the
amount of dormancy fees and other charges that are permitted.3 17
Consumers' problems with gift cards are not confined to dormancy
fees and short expiration dates, however. 318 If the EFTA applied to
310. Id. § 106.
311. Credit Card Act § 107.
312. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (Supp. 2009).
313. Credit Card Act § 102(b) (adding § 149(a) to TILA).
314. Credit Card Act § 149(b).
315. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2009); see Best v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987); Perdue v.
Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985).
316. Credit Card Act § 401 (adding § 915 to EFTA).
317. Id.
318. Examples of other types of problems include liability for loss of funds due to defective card
readers, damage to cards, and unauthorized use of cards. In addition, there is the lack of a required error
resolution procedure, privacy protection, supervision of unregulated and uninsured issuers, and private
rights of action. See MODEL STORED VALUE CARD PROTECTION ACT (Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.) for an
[Vol. 26:41200
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gift cards, consumers would have the benefit of substantial
protection. Congress gave to the FRB the responsibility to decide
which, if any, portions of the EFTA will apply to gift cards.
319
Legislators believe some creditor practices are acceptable as long
as they are disclosed. Some practices, however, are against public
policy and should be prohibited. In between are practices that are
questionable and that consumers should be able to avoid if they wish
without being required to forego the opportunity to obtain credit
altogether. In regard to these "in between" practices, there has been a
great deal of controversy over whether to require consumers to take
affirmative steps to opt out of these practices, or to make it far less
likely consumers will be saddled with them by making them
inoperative unless the consumer opts in.320 Significantly, the Credit
Card Act provides the consumer-friendly opt-in approach to over-the-
limit transactions.
321
As discussed above, technology has both benefited and harmed
consumers. 322 The Act uses the Internet to assist consumers by
requiring creditors to maintain Internet sites on which they must post
their written agreements.
323
The Credit Card Act may, in retrospect, be viewed as the
forerunner of a new stage in consumer protection legislation. The Act
has many positive features that will benefit consumers-meaningful
disclosures, opt-in, and substantive protections. It is responsive to the
contention of consumer advocates' that more than disclosure is
needed to adequately protect consumers.324 There are certain major
deficiencies, however. For example, almost forty years after the rate
controversy surrounding the UCCC and almost thirty years after
example of legislation dealing with these issues. BUDNITZ, SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS, supra note 186, at
621-28.
319. Credit Card Act § 401 (adding § 915 to EFTA).
320. Eric Poggemiller, The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Much
Ado About Nothing?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 617, 627-35 (2002); Jeff Sovem, Opting in, Opting out, or
No Option: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1075 (1999).
321. Credit Card Act § 102(k).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 193-98.
323. Credit Card Act § 204.
324. Barak Y. Orbach, The New Regulatory Era-An Introduction, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 561 (2009)
(stating that the Credit Card Act bans "many practices that were customary until its enactment").
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federal deregulation of interest rates, there is, generally, no federal
regulation of the rates, charges and fees that creditors may impose.
325
While the Credit Card Act prohibits specific overreaching practices
in which creditors have been engaged, it is likely creditors will
develop new practices that are not specifically banned in the Act and
326fail to clearly disclose the costs and risks of those new practices.
Creditors will implement these new practices because their business
model depends on collecting late fees from consumers who pay
327late. Moreover, the Act does nothing to restrict creditors from
forcing consumers into creditor-friendly arbitration in which
arbitrators are not required to follow any law, much less the new Act.
Finally, crucial provisions are delegated to administrative agencies.
Based on past experience, there is always the possibility they will
issue regulations that provide little relief for consumers.
President Obama's proposed Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act of 2009 (CFPA) appears to be based, in part, on the
belief that those agencies cannot be trusted to adequately protect
consumers. 328 By transferring all of the consumer financial protection
functions of federal agencies to a new agency 329 as well as personnel
engaged in consumer protection in those agencies, 330 the CFPA, in
325. RENUART & KEEST-CREDT, supra note 62, at 42-43,46-47.
326. See James Surowiecki, Caveat Mortgagor, NEW YORKER, July 6, 2009, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/fmancial/2009/07/06/090706ta-talk-surowiecki ("[Kieeping customers
confused often seems to be a business strategy.").
327. James Surowiecki, House of Cards, NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 2009, at 45. See generally Eric
Dash, Bank Fees Rise As Lenders Try to Offset Losses, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009.
328. Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act (CFPA) of 2009,
www.financialstability.gov/docs/CFPA-Act.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (proposed by President
Obama). A somewhat modified version was submitted in the House. CFPA, H.R. 3126, 1 ith Cong. (as
introduced by House, July 8, 2009). The text discusses the president's proposal because an
accompanying Treasury Department Report sheds light on the rationale for some of the proposals in that
proposal. Professor Elizabeth Warren provided scholarly support for these proposals before the 2008
elections. Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer: The Case for Regulation, HARV. MAG., May-June
2008, at 34. Some claim the FRB had adequate notice of the coming mortgage crisis as early as 2002
and could have taken steps to ameliorate the problem. Jon C. Gamboa & Robert Gnaizda, Viewpoint:
Fed Had Plenty of Warning on Mortgage Issues, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21, 2007, at 1I, available at 2007
WLNR 18470317. In 2008, the FRB issued regulations to crack down on abusive credit card practices,
but some claimed it did so only as a result of pressure from Congress, the threat of Congressional
legislative action, and the loss of credibility. Steven Sloan, In Focus: In Fed's Regulatory Curriculum, A
Course in Political Calculus, AM. BANKER, May 12, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 8773817.
329. CFPA § 1061.
330. Id. at 1064.
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effect, rejects the suitability of the current structure. The Treasury
Department's report accompanying the CFPA bill describes the
deficiencies in the current regulatory system.331 The new agency
would overcome these deficiencies, for example, by having wide
jurisdiction over financial companies, whether or not they are owned
by banks. Its sole mission would be protecting consumers. In
contrast, agencies such as the OCC and Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) have a potentially conflicting primary mission of ensuring the
safety and soundness of financial institutions. The FRB's primary
responsibility is to set monetary policy.
One of the major impediments to consumer protection has been
OCC's and OTS's preemption of state law and consequent blocking
of state enforcement of that law. 332 A 2009 Supreme Court case is a
major victory for consumer protection because the Court held federal
agencies cannot preempt state enforcement of substantive state
law.333 The decision, however, did not provide any guidance on how
to resolve a dispute where a federal agency claims a state law
conflicts with federal banking law. That is an issue for Congress to
decide. Moreover, the legislature is better suited than the courts to
331. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 87, at 56 (pointing out the FTC's
jurisdictional limits; the banking agencies' proclivity to "see the world through the lenses of institutions
and markets, not consumers"; the opportunities for "regulatory arbitrage" in which firms choose the
least aggressive regulator; and state and federal bank supervisory agencies' mandate to ensure "financial
institutions act prudently, a mission that . . . often conflicts with their consumer protection
responsibilities").
332. Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank Preemption of
State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 981 (2006); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
OCC'S Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual
Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004).
333. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2717 (2009) (holding that the OCC can
preempt state law that relates to its visitorial powers, but not state enforcement of substantive state law).
While a victory for consumer protection by permitting state enforcement, the Court's holding that states
cannot usurp agencies' visitorial authority precludes state agency investigations, including subpoena
power, and requires states to go to court and engage in discovery. Absent the power to subpoena or
otherwise examine bank records, it may not be possible in many cases for states to gather enough
evidence of violations to justify filing a lawsuit. Cheyenne Hopkins, States Win in Supreme Surprise,
AM. BANKER, June 30, 2009, at 1-2, available at 2009 WLNR 12419230 (observing that the Cuomo
decision limits the powers of state attorneys general). Furthermore, it is not always clear when the state
is exercising its enforcement authority and not its visitorial powers. Cheyenne Hopkins, A Preemption of
Clarity, Court Ruling Raises Enforcement Questions, AM. BANKER, July 14, 2009, at 1, 9, available at
2009 WLNR 13329429.
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make that determination because legislation can provide standards for
when preemption is appropriate, and in setting the standards
Congress can take into account the entire regulatory infrastructure
which is affected by preemption, the proper role of federalism and
states' rights, and the effect on financial markets.
The CFPA seeks to do that.334 The general principle established
under the CFPA is that the Act does not alter state law unless it is
inconsistent with the CFPA, "and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency. '" 335 Furthermore, a state law is not inconsistent if it
provides greater consumer protection than that provided under the
CFPA.33 6 The CFPA also clarifies the power of the states to enforce
state consumer laws of general application against institutions subject
to federal financial regulation. For example, state consumer laws
relating to unfair and deceptive practice, fraud, repossessions,
foreclosure, and collection law apply to national banks.337
The CFPA grants the new agency extensive powers to investigate
conduct that may violate the CFPA.338 It can conduct hearings and
adjudication proceedings.339 The agency can bring civil actions, using
its own attorneys.340 These powers are essential, given the severe
restrictions placed on private enforcement, including forced
arbitration. 34 1
The CFPA does not prohibit mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, but
grants the new agency the power to "prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations on the use" of such agreements. 342 The standards for
doing so are quite vague. The agency can take any of the actions
specified if they "are in the public interest and for the protection of
334. CFPA subtit. D. See Cheyenne Hopkins, Industy Is Underdog in Fight over New Agency, AM.
BANKER, July 1, 2009, at 1, 3, available at 2009 WLNR 12492225 (reporting that the banking industry
strongly opposed the preemption provision, but believed the Cuomo case made opposition more difficult
because the decision upheld states' enforcement actions against banks).
335. CFPA § 1041(a)(1).
336. Id. § 1041(a)(2).
337. Id. § 1043 (adding 12 U.S.C. § 5136C).
338. Id. § 1051.
339. Id. § 1053.
340. Id. § 1054
341. See supra text accompanying notes 158-70. But see notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
342. CFPA § 1025.
1204 [Vol. 26:4
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1204 2009-2010
1204   I IT    ( .  
   
 t ,   
 
    
t s'  . 
  334 l  
  
i t t    
i tency.,,335 i t t  
  
  336    
     
   
 ,  
 337 
   t  t    i     
   338   
  
rneys.340  
 ,   
34 I 
      
   
     
  
  
.  tit .   i , ustr   erdog i  i t   , . 
, l  , , t  ilable t        
    lt 
 t  i i  l  t t ' t   . 
. 0 (a)(I). 
. /d. ( )( ). 
. .  . . 
. d.  1. 
. d.  . 
d  
. ra  
.  
58
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss4/2
2010] THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
consumers." 343 The Treasury report provides an explanation for this
provision. It first notes that consumers do not know that the form
contracts they sign when taking out a loan waives their right to a
trial.3 " It may be true that many consumers do not fully realize the
significance of this waiver, but many lenders disclose the waiver
clearly. Far more significant is the fact, not mentioned in the report,
that whether or not consumers see or understand the waiver, they
have no choice since the waivers are practically universal.345 The
report does point out another important feature, however, stating that
the dispute is heard by "a private party dependent on large firms
[lenders] for their business." 346 The report says the new agency
should determine if arbitrations "promote fair adjudication and
effective redress" and should ban the clauses if necessary.347 Making
that determination may prove challenging since the results of
arbitration proceedings are private, except in California where the
law requires disclosure of limited information. 348 Nevertheless,
merely looking at the language of the clauses may provide sufficient
information to justify agency action. Requiring that the arbitration
take place only in one location in the United States, regardless of
where the consumer lives, and banning class actions are examples of
clauses that may indicate the arbitration will not be fair and the
consumer may not be able to obtain adequate redress.
While this provision should be comforting to critics of consumer
arbitration, it does not go nearly as far as current law in regard to
military personnel where arbitration is prohibited altogether in regard
to pay day loans.349 The CFPA also is not as sweeping as the pending
343. Id.
344. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 87, at 62.
345. Alderman, supra note 158, at 154.
346. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FNANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 87, at 62; see Rossman Testimony,
supra note 264 (testifying that arbitration services make money by convincing businesses to select their
services).
347. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 87, at 62.
348. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9 (2003).
349. 10 U.S.C. § 987(e) (Supp. 2009). The Department of Defense issued regulations limiting the
statute to pay day loans, vehicle title loans, and tax refund loans. 32 C.F.R. § 232 (2009).
1205
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Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 that bans all predispute arbitration
agreements. 35
0
On a more abstract level, the Treasury Department's report
suggests the institutionalization of the consumer movement is far
from complete and one goal of the CFPA bill is to further that
institutionalization. The report proclaims: "Consumer protection is a
critical foundation for our financial system." 351 In order to ensure that
consumer protection is given its due, it must have "an independent
seat at the table in our financial regulatory system.', 352 The public
must have "confidence that consumer protection is important to
regulators," 353 and that requires "clear accountability in government"
for consumer protection. 354 The report recognizes that it is not
sufficient merely to grant regulatory authority to agencies. "[W]e
need first to instill that culture [of consumer protection] in the federal
regulatory structure., 355 The ultimate goal is for consumer protection
to be part of the culture of the entire society, so that financial
institutions not only comply with agency rules, but "the financial
system develops and sustains a culture that places a high value on
helping responsible consumers thrive and treating all consumers
fairly."356 In other words, the institutionalization must occur at all
levels: the public, government agencies, and even financial
institutions.
CONCLUSION
It is too soon to know if recent progress in extending consumer
protection, such as the Military Lending Law, the Credit Card Act,
and the proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act will
350. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 11 1th Cong. (2009). The bill also bans predispute
arbitration of employment and franchise disputes or disputes arising under statutes to protect civil rights.
351. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, supra note 87, at 7.
352. Id. at 56.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
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result in significant and long-term benefits to consumers. For
example, Congress may fail to enact the Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act and once the current financial crisis is over,
the federal agencies may return to their lackluster efforts to protect
consumers. Credit card issuers may develop new techniques for
unfairly imposing credit costs that consumers cannot understand and
cannot avoid if all companies impose them. Technology may always
be well ahead of regulation as the payments industry develops new
payment devices and processing systems. Cyber criminals may pose
an ever-increasing threat to the entire financial system.
357
Despite the inevitable setbacks for consumers, this article contends
that consumer protection law is institutionalized and is part of a
social movement. Furthermore, the movement's goals have become
embedded in society's values. If that is correct, there will continue to
be organizations as well as individual lawyers who will use the legal
system to push back those who try to abuse the marketplace, prod
regulators to enforce the law more aggressively, persuade judges and
juries to find predatory businesses liable, and pull legislators toward
more effective consumer protection laws.
358
357. E.g., Rhonda Cook, International Hackers Stole $9.4 Million in One Day, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Nov. 11, 2009, at B1.
358. The journey of the proposed federal consumer agency through Congress illustrates the major
setbacks that can occur. E.g., Stacy Kaper, House Deal Bolsters Defense of Preemption, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 11, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 24944239 (reporting that the House bill was amended to permit
the OCC to preempt state consumer protection laws from applying to national banks); Legislative
Update, AM. BANKER, Dec. 10, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 24841590 (reporting that several
industries had been exempted from coverage under the House bill, including "auto dealers,
manufactured home brokers, realty agents, lawyers, accountants, mutual funds, and credit, title and
mortgage insurance agents").
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